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The record of traditional safeguard provisions of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World 
Trade Organization provides useful information about 
how a special agricultural safeguard might be made 
effective. The success of existing safeguard or flexibility 
provisions to sustain long-run liberalization programs 
stems from their requiring objective, transparent, and 
participatory decisions on the application of the import 
restrictions they allow. The proposed special agricultural 
safeguard expands by arithmetic formula the bounds 
within which a Member may impose a new import 
restriction.  Analysis reported here suggests that the 
formulas provide a poor guide for policy, indicating that 
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they would frequently prescribe action that is not needed 
and fail to prescribe action when it would be appropriate.  
Analysis of the existing agricultural safeguard, to which 
the special agricultural safeguard is similar, indicates 
that it has functioned not as an allowance for occasional 
response to unusual situations but as an expansion of the 
limits Members have accepted through tariff bindings. 
To be useful, the special agricultural safeguard should do 
more than provide formulas for import restrictions. It 
should provide for objective and participatory processes 
that would bring forward relevant information and guide 
an objective and balanced accounting of the interests at 
play. 
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WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, in announcing failure of the July 2008 
ministerial meetings, reported that out of a to-do list of 20 topics, 18 had seen 
positions converge but the gap did not narrow on the 19th — the special 
safeguard for agriculture (SSM).  I examine here the proposed SSM against the 
experience of the international community with other GATT/WTO safeguard 
provisions. 
 
Other GATT/WTO flexibility provisions 
In GATT’s early decades renegotiation of previously agreed tariff bindings was 
the most frequently used flexibility provision.  As the GATT/WTO system became 
more juridical, adjustments previously treated as negotiations were taken up as 
evaluations against specified criteria.  These evaluations are unilateral in that 
they are conducted by national authorities, but evaluation is against a collectively 
agreed ‘just cause’ (e.g., injurious dumping) and it follows collectively agreed 
procedures.  The procedures involve input from foreign interested parties as well 
as domestic and national applications are under continuous international 
scrutiny.  The various GATT/WTO flexibility provisions – renegotiations, Article 
XIX safeguards, antidumping, restrictions to protect the balance of payments – 
have been extensively used but pragmatically speaking, not overused.  Since the 
Uruguay Round agreements are in effect, in no country has this use outpaced 
the general thrust of liberalization. 
 
SSM proposals 
The SSM would allow the imposition of an additional import duty in response to 
an import surge (volume trigger) or when the price of imports falls markedly 
below previous prices (price trigger).  There would be limits on the number of 
tariff lines on which a country could at any time have SSM measures in place as 
well as on the magnitude of the additional duties.  The SSM would be available 
only to developing countries, in form it parallels the existing agricultural 
safeguard (SSG) that has been used largely by developed countries.  Current 
differences in proposals are primarily over the parameters of the triggers and 
limits.  The G-33 of developing countries proposes parameters that would allow 
more and larger import restrictions.  Proposals from developed countries, 
principally the EEC and the USA, would allow fewer and smaller. 
 
SSM formulas as policy guidance 
The SSM or any other trade policy mechanism should not be judged by the 
frequency with which it would allow or not allow import restrictions.  It should be 
judged by how effectively it distinguished instances in which restriction was the 
better choice from instances in which not to restrict was the choice that better 
advanced the implementing country’s interests. 
By this standard, the usefulness of the trigger formulas does not stand up well 
against evidence.  One relevant analysis is Raul Q. Montemayor’s (2008) 
  iii  iv
simulation exercise.  As to triggering additional duties in periods of serious 
domestic-price undercutting by imports, his results show that: 
  in more than half of the periods of serious price undercutting, the SSM would 
not have triggered an additional duty, and 
  more that half of the additional duties triggered would not be in periods of 
serious price undercutting. 
A second analysis, one I conducted with Francis Ng, pays attention to the SSM 
(as the SSG) using unit values of imports from all sources as the basis for trigger 
prices.  Prices often differ considerably from source-to-source, the result could 
be to authorize restriction when there was no surge of import volume or change 
of price from the previous years.  We found that in a given year, unit values from 
specific countries are sufficiently below aggregate unit values to trigger 
restrictions on 59 percent of agricultural tariff lines.  By comparison, the tariff 
modalities allow each developing Member to exempt one-third of tariff lines from 
full application of the tariff formula as Sensitive Products, 12 percent as Special 
Products.  Thus typical ‘noise’ in trade data means that the SSM will bring with it 
a flexibility almost twice as large as the Special Products and Sensitive Products 
exemptions in the tariff negotiations.  Unit values tend to be lower on shipments 
from developing countries, hence these spuriously allowed restrictions are most 
likely to apply exports from developing Members. 
‘Filling in’ against shocks is difficult 
The finding above – that rules to ‘fill in’ with policy remedies in ‘exceptional’ 
years are likely to be inaccurate – is not an isolated one.  Studies sparked by an 
earlier, 1970s, concern to deal with the instability likewise found that workable 
decision rules to identify when a buffer stock should buy or sell, or when the 
IMF’s Compensatory Finance Facility (CFF) should lend or collect, were difficult to 
devise.  Simulations indicated that even when determinations of trend were 
based on sophisticated regressions, buffer stocks turned out to be on the wrong 
side of the market as often as on the correct side. Viewed in retrospect, more 




The proposed SSM formulas would provide a poor guide for policy – would 
frequently prescribe action when it is not needed, frequently fail to prescribe 
action when it is appropriate.  There are no procedural requirements that might 
otherwise guide good policy choice.  It, like the existing SSG, would function 
minimally as a guide for making decisions as to when an import restriction might 
be appropriate, principally as an expansion beyond tariff bindings of the 
GATT/WTO’s limits on the restrictions a Member can impose unilaterally. A Special Safeguard Mechanism for Agricultural 
Imports and the Management of Reform 
 
WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, in announcing the failure of the July 2008 
ministerial meetings, reported that of a to-do list of 20 topics, 18 had seen 
positions converge but the gap did not narrow on the 19th — the special 
safeguard mechanism for developing countries.
1  I examine here the proposed 
SSM against the experience of the international community with other 
GATT/WTO safeguard provisions. 
1. OBJECTIVES, PERSPECTIVE AND CONTENT OF THIS PAPER 
In this paper I will examine the proposed special safeguard mechanism for 
agriculture (SSM) against the experience of the international community with 
other GATT/WTO safeguard or flexibility provisions.  My primary objectives are to 
identify what in the existing safeguard/flexibility provisions has made them 
useful, and what this tells us about how the SSM might be made useful. 
As to perspective, while there has been considerable research on such 
instruments, virtually all of it views them as devices for creating protection rather 
than for defending the long-run viability of reforms.
2  I want to apply here a 
more positive perspective – how a safeguard can support policy managers in 
their objective of managing agricultural trade policy as a part of long-run 
program of modernization and reform.
3  This sense of ‘useful’ recognizes that 
reform is an inexact science; it also recognizes that the correct decision will 
sometimes be to impose a restriction. 
The overall conclusion I reach is that the effectiveness of GATT/WTO safeguard 
or flexibility provisions to sustain long-run liberalization programs stems from 
their requiring objective, transparent and participatory national decisions on the 
application of new/exceptional import restrictions.  Their usefulness does not 
stem from the ‘formulas’ they have provided, e.g., injury or injurious dumping. 
Applying this perspective to the proposed SSM, it includes no procedural 
requirements; it defines by mathematical formula when a Member may impose a 
                                         
1 Robert Wolfe (2009) documents that there had been almost no preparatory negotiation or 
discussion of SSM.  The breakdown, in his interpretation, was less a matter of conflict of interest 
than a matter of Members having established no basis on which workings of alternative formulas 
or parameters might be evaluated, the interests of one Member weighed against the interests of 
another. 
2 Nelson (2006) lists more than 200 references, the preponderance of which take the negative 
perspective. 
3 A related methodological concern is to avoid the mercantilist perspective that tends to impose 
itself on any topic taken up in a trade negotiation. Discussion of SSM proposals suggests that 
some analysts find virtue in anything that justifies fewer restrictions, some find virtue in anything 
that justifies more. 
  1new import restriction.  Results reported here suggest that the principal impact 
of the formulas is to expand Members’ scope for unilaterally imposing restrictions 
but that they provide a poor guide as to when it makes economic or political 
sense to do so.  Simulations indicate that the formulas frequently prescribe 
action when it is not needed, and frequently fail to prescribe action when it is 
appropriate. 
If the SSM discussion is about supporting members to make good policy 
decisions, then it should be about process that will help a government to reach a 
correct decision and to sustain that decision among its various constituencies.  
Judging from past experience, a key element will be to identify the domestic 
‘interested parties’ affected by a decision to restrict or not to restrict imports, to 
give them voice in the decision. 
If that discussion is about the SSG formulas or those proposed for the SSM, then 
it is about defining the scope of unilateral action that Members retain, not about 
when it makes sense to take – or not take – action. 
As to how the discussion proceeds, Sections 2, 3 and 4 look into how GATT/WTO 
safeguard or flexibility provisions have functioned and evolved, the 
characteristics that made them supportive management tools.  I examine in 
Section 5 the special safeguard provisions (SSG) of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture.  It and the proposed SSM have similar structures; 
hence how the SSG has operated will provide valuable insight into how the SSM 
might operate.  Sections 6 and 7 examine the proposed SSM.  I pay particular 
attention to the mechanism as a decision mechanism; if the proposed ‘triggers’ 
will allow import restrictions when they are appropriate, not allow them when 
they are not.  Section 8 looks briefly at interactions between the SSM and the 
current state of negotiations on tariff reductions, section 9 offers conclusions and 
comments. 
2. FUNCTIONS OF A SAFEGUARD MECHANISM: FLEXIBILITY 
WITH DISCIPLINE – AND GUIDANCE TOWARD GOOD POLICY 
CHOICES 
Managing the trade policy dimensions of agricultural policy is a complex 
challenge for developing country leaders.  On the one hand, integration into the 
international economy is a critical part of the reform and modernization that they 
want their agricultural sectors to achieve.
4  Such integration will provide export 
opportunities; it will also provide competitive discipline that spurs efficiency in 
                                         
4 Zwain (2008) provides a useful reminder that improving the efficiency of the agricultural sector 
and creating alternative employment for resources whose comparative advantage lies elsewhere 
involves much more than the management of trade policies.  Even where trade is concerned, 
reforms that improve domestic markets and provide better linkages to international markets 
through better transportation and better communication of price signals may be more important 
than the management of import policies – the subject of this paper. 
  2domestic production and thus higher incomes. On the other hand, policy 
managers will be prudent at times to provide protection against short-run shocks 
so as to ensure that competitive producers survive over the long run.  Temporary 
protection might be justified as well for uncompetitive producers whose 
livelihood depends on agriculture and for whom there are no immediate 
alternative sources of employment/income.  Also entering into the equation are 
the interests of the non-agriculture poor, for whom higher food prices mean 
lower real income. 
The roles of international trade agreements 
The longer-run benefits of commitment to a program of liberalization through 
negotiation and bound commitments are familiar.  The mercantilist quid pro quo 
for domestic reforms – improved access to foreign markets – will help to provide 
alternative uses for domestic resources whose comparative advantage is not in 
agriculture.  Moreover, such commitment to reform through international 
agreement will provide continuing pressure on the sector to reform as well as 
support achievement of longer-term objectives against the many pressures that 
will arise to go in other directions. 
While the long-run objective implies a general momentum toward liberalization, 
natural events and shifts of agricultural policies in other countries imply that any 
country will face considerable short-run volatility in international markets.  Thus 
international commitments to long-term reform usually include ‘safeguard’ 
provisions that provide flexibility to deal with shorter term events.  Such 
provisions allow new trade restrictions but at the same time attempt to discipline 
against their overuse so that a longer-run momentum toward liberalization is 
maintained. 
Dimensions of a safeguard/flexibility provision 
Membership in the WTO commits a government to use only approved 
instruments of trade control, principally tariffs; to apply them in a generally non-
discriminatory manner and to subject them to a long-time process of binding and 
reduction through negotiation.
5  Safeguards, being a part of the overall 
agreement, reflect each Member’s overall and long-term commitment to 
liberalization.  Flexibility in this context does not refer to the freedom a 
government would maintain by remaining outside the agreement or by not 
binding its tariff rates through the agreement.  It refers to disciplined or guided 
flexibility intended to keep its application by each Member in line with the overall 
and long-run objectives implicit in membership. 
I will review safeguard mechanisms from the perspectives of three 
characteristics: flexibility, discipline, and guidance toward good policy choices. 
                                         
5 Hudec 1987, p. 133. 
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Flexibility 
Trade liberalization is not rocket science.  There will be uncertainty as to the 
economic impact reforms will have and as to the intensity of the resistance that 
impacts might provoke.  In the face of reaction that might disrupt the entire 
liberalization program, good policy becomes the pragmatic matter of managing 
pressures for exceptions so as to maintain a general momentum for liberalization 
and to strengthen the politics of avoiding rather than of imposing such 
restrictions in the future.  The correct choice will sometimes be to impose an 
import restriction. 
Discipline 
At the same time, a safeguard provision should provide discipline against 
overuse; discipline so that the possibility of introducing new trade restrictions is 
not so attractive that it overcomes the government’s intention to maintain a 
long-run momentum toward liberalization.  There should remain a general 
pressure toward not applying the measures that, in special circumstances, the 
safeguard provision allows.  The occasional step back should not only preserve 
previous steps forward, it should strengthen the politics of taking more steps 
forward in the future. 
Policy guidance 
Finally, a safeguard provision might be expected to do more than make 
pragmatic political sense.  Beyond the matter of taking one step back in order to 
preserve two steps forward, economic science does recognize situations in which 
an import restriction might itself advance the national economic interest.  The 
rhetoric of antidumping, for example, suggests that an antidumping action 
follows more or less the same economic logic as an anti-trust action.  
Interventions that neutralize ‘distortions’ (situations in which the market price of 
a product differs from its true economic cost) will serve the national economic 
interest in the long-run as well as in the short-run. 
The meaning in practice of each of these criteria will be elaborated in the review 
of experience with GATT/WTO safeguard provisions.  3. GATT PROVISIONS THAT ALLOW NEW IMPORT 
RESTRICTIONS 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is an agreement and the 
World Trade Organization an organization intended to promote the expansion of 
international trade.  Even so, the GATT/WTO includes several provisions that 
explicitly acknowledge the rights that Member countries retain to impose new 
trade restrictions or to replace old ones.  This section reviews use of such 
provisions. 
As the review will show, integrated into the allowance of restrictive measures is a 
concern to discipline their use; to ensure that they do not become disguised 
forms of ordinary protection and that the overall impact of the agreement is 
liberalization.  Analysis also indicates that usage is perhaps the only guide to the 
functions of these provisions; e.g., antidumping functions as a ‘safeguard’ rather 
than a discipline on uneconomic trade practice.  It shows also that though the 
criteria for use of the various flexibility provisions appear to differ – safeguard, 
antidumping, balance of payments provisions – they are in practice quite 
fungible.  Why one measure is used has been more a matter of political and 
administrative convenience than the economics of the particular situation.  
Analysis also shows that the administrative disciplines the GATT/WTO imposes – 
recognition of and participation of interested parties, public availability of 
information, publication of decisions and reasons for decisions – have been an 
important support for good policy management. 
Renegotiations and emergency actions 
In GATT’s first decade the most prominent of the provisions that sanction new 
restrictions was Article XXVIII, which provided for renegotiation of any tariff 
reduction a participating country had made.
6  The 1947 GATT gave each country 
an automatic right to renegotiate any of its reductions after three years (Article 
XXVII) and, under ‘sympathetic consideration’ procedures, reductions could be 
renegotiated more quickly.  As to discipline on the use of renegotiation, the 
process carries with it the requirement to compensate – in undoing a previous 
                                         
6 A GATT tariff bargain is consummated by each participating country submitting a schedule of 
tariff rates, by tariff line, that it accepts as bound legal obligation.  A WTO Member may 
unilaterally increase any applied tariff rate up to the bound rate or increase without limit the rate 
applied in any tariff line that is not bound..(Many developing country at the Uruguay Round 
bound their tariffs at ceiling rates somewhat above the rates they had applied since the 
liberalizations of the last quarter of the 20
th century.). Once a tariff line is so bound, a country 
must cite ‘permission’ under a specific GATT/WTO provision to justify increasing the tariff rate 
above the bound rate or otherwise imposing a new restriction on that tariff line. A renegotiation 
is more precisely about increasing the level at which a country has bound its tariff rather than 
about undoing a tariff reduction it has agreed. 
  5tariff reduction a country would be expected to offer exporters something 
equivalent on other tariff lines.
7 
Article XIX, titled ‘Emergency Actions on Imports of Particular Products’ but often 
referred to as the escape clause or the safeguard clause, provides a country 
quicker access to much the same renegotiation process.  In instances of 
particularly troublesome increases of imports – that cause or threaten serious 
injury to domestic producers
8 – a country could introduce a new restriction, then 
afterwards negotiate a compensating agreement with its trading partners.
9 
Reciprocity as discipline 
GATT negotiators were aware that these mechanisms offered the potential to 
overcome the principal purpose of the agreement: a general reduction of trade 
barriers.  There are consequently certain disciplines built into each mechanism, 
the basic discipline on new restrictions through renegotiation being reciprocity.  A 
country seeking to increase a restriction was expected to offer compensating 
reductions on other products.  If supplier countries did not consider these to be 
satisfactory, they could retaliate. i.e., increase their restrictions in a parallel 
manner.
10 
Figure 3.1 traces early usage of the different provisions.  Within 15 years after 
the GATT first came into effect, every one of the 29 participating countries that 
had bound tariff reductions had undertaken at least one renegotiation—in total, 
110 renegotiations, or almost four per country.  These actions were in large part 
renegotiations under Article XXVIII, supplemented by emergency actions (restrict 
first, then negotiate compensation) under the procedures of Article XIX.
11 
Over time, the mix shifted toward a larger proportion of emergency actions.  In 
use, Article XIX emergency actions and Article XXVIII renegotiations 
complemented each other.  Nine of the fifteen pre-1962 Article XIX actions that 
were significant enough that the exporter insisted on compensation (or 
                                         
7 The early GATT rounds were collections of bilateral negotiations, but tariff cuts had to be made 
on a most-favored-nation basis (i.e. applicable to imports from all GATT Members).  A 
renegotiation was not with the entire Gatt membership but only with the country with whom that 
reduction was initially negotiated, plus any other countries enumerated by the GATT as ‘principal 
suppliers’. 
8 The Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards (but not the initial GATT) requires a formal 
investigation and determination of injury. 
9 Though the GATT asked a country taking emergency action to consult with exporting countries 
beforehand, it allowed the action to come first in ‘critical circumstances.’  In practice, the action 
has come first most of the time. 
10 This ultimate discipline, retaliation, was itself subject to discipline.  When the GATT was first 
agreed the trading system was in the shadow of the chain reaction of protection and retaliation 
that had severely restricted international trade between World Wars I and II.  Hence the matter 
of retaliation was cushioned by several administrative steps intended to bring the countries 
involved to reach a mutually acceptable solution that would not start such a chain reaction. 
11 GATT 1994, pp. 863-910. 
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threatened retaliation) were eventually resolved as Article XXVIII renegotiations.  




12 GATT 1994, pp. 477-516  
Figure 3.1 
RENEGOTIATIONS (GATT ARTICLE XXVIII), EMERGENCY ACTIONS (GATT ARTICLE XIX), AND 







































































































































Renegotiations (Article XXVIII) Emergency Actions (Article XIX) VERs in Place
 
Sources: Amelia Porges, Petros C. Mavroidis, Friedl Weiss, Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law 
and Practice, GATT, Geneva, Switzerland, 1994 (for actions under Articles XIX and XXVIII before 
1995); The WTO Committee on Safeguards, Annual Reports (for safeguards after 1995); The 
International Trade Environment, GATT—Report by the Director General 1989-1990, GATT, 
Geneva, Switzerland, 1990,  p. 21.  
Notes:  VERs for 1970–1989 do not include bilateral quantitative restrictions under the Multi-
Fiber Agreement; data were not available for VERs before 1970 and during 1990–1994. 
  8Protection contingent on circumstances as discipline 
In addition to the obligation to compensate and the ultimate threat of retaliation, 
Article XIX introduces a second source of discipline: conditions.  Article XIX 
provides legal clearance only in instances where imports cause or threaten 
serious injury to domestic producers. 
Some negotiators argued that the ‘injury’ criterion would provide little discipline.  
Import restrictions had been put in place to increase domestic production, 
removing them was indeed likely to displace it.  Allowing new import restrictions 
when removal of old ones led to displacement of domestic production had the 
potential to undo a large part of the reductions.  Negotiators consequently added 
the condition ‘as a result of unforeseen developments;’
13 so that the normal or 
expected results of a tariff reduction would not justify an increase. 
Guidance for good policy 
Behind the inclusion of injury as a criterion for making an exception to a general 
policy of liberalization was a certain perception that the national economic 
interest would be advanced by applying this criterion.  GATT Article XIX is almost 
word-for-word taken from the safeguard provision included in every pre-GATT 
trade agreement of the United States, and in US trade policy this safeguard 
clause was an expression of the ‘scientific tariff’ concept that for 150 years had 
dominated tariff thinking in the United States.
14  According to this thinking, the 
‘optimal’ tariff rate on any product is one equal to the difference between the 
domestic and the foreign cost of production.  In the US, safeguard investigations 
had replaced an older flexibility provision, ‘Section 336.’  Section 336 allowed the 
President to raise or to lower a tariff rate after an investigation by the US Tariff 
Commission to determine the domestic-foreign cost difference.
15 The early 
methodology for safeguard investigations was a close copy of the older Section 
336 methodology.  Non-injurious imports were, operationally speaking, imports 
that entered over a tariff equal to the difference between domestic and foreign 
costs. 
Of course, modern economics does not recognize the cost-difference principle as 
identifying where a trade intervention would make economic sense. 
Negotiated export restraints – reciprocity outside legal 
bounds 
By the mid 1970s, formal use of Article XIX and of the renegotiation process 
began to wane.  Actions taken under the escape clause tended to involve 
                                         
13 XIX.1(a) 
14 Two good sources on historical US tariff policy and thinking are Stanwood (1903) and Hull 
(1946). 
15 Over the instrument’s lifetime, 1931-1941, Section 336 investigations led to 29 tariff increases, 
25 reductions and 47 decisions not to change the rate.  (Finger and Harrison. 1996, 204). 
  9negligible amounts of world trade in relatively minor product categories.
16 Big 
problems such as textile and apparel imports were handled another way, through 
the negotiation of ‘voluntary’ export restraint agreements (VERs).  The various 
textile agreements, beginning in 1962, provided GATT sanction to VERs on 
textiles and apparel.  The same method, ‘negotiated’ export restraints or VERs, 
were used by the developed economies to control troublesome imports into 
several other important sectors, such as steel in the United States and 
automobiles in the European Union. 
Except for those especially sanctioned by the textile arrangements, VERs were 
clearly GATT-illegal.
17  However, while VERs violated GATT legalisms, they 
accorded well with its ethic of reciprocity and their negotiation controlled for the 
possibility of chain reaction of import restrictions from one country to another, as 
had been disastrous in the 1930s. 
The reality of power politics was at play, but compensation was involved.  
Reduced export volumes were compensated by higher prices, the result being 
often a net gain for exporters.
18  In some instances the quid pro quo was foreign 
aid or some other non-trade consideration. 
Though VERs were clearly GATT-illegal, they prevailed through the 1970s and 
the 1980s as the predominant mechanism for managing troublesome imports.  
(Figure 3.1) Their use came to an end with the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Safeguards.  Its Article 11 includes an explicit prohibition and a procedure for 
notification and phasing out of those in place.  One might speculate that the 
reasons behind this elimination included: 
•  The increasing weight of developing countries in world trade and their 
increasingly active role in the GATT system 
•  The growing realization in developed economies that a VER was a costly 
form of protection
19 
•  The long-term legal pressure of the GATT rules 
•  The availability of an attractive, GATT-legal alternative, antidumping. 
Antidumping ascends 
Antidumping was a minor instrument when the GATT was negotiated, and 
provision for allowing antidumping measures was included with little controversy.  
In 1958, when the GATT Contracting Parties first canvassed themselves about 
                                         
16 1980 statistics show that actions taken under Gatt Article xix covered imports valued at US$ 
1.6 billion, while total world trade was at the same time valued at US$ 2,000 billion (Sampson, 
1987, p. 145). 
17Gatt, 1994, p. 494. 
18 Had imports been restricted to the same volume by a tariff, the scarcity value of the restriction 
would have been collected by the importing country. 
19 For example, Hufbauer and Elliott (1994) found that of the welfare loss placed on the U.S. 
economy from all forms of protection in place in the early 1990s, over 83 percent of that loss 
came from VERs. 
  10the use of antidumping measures, the resulting tally showed only 37 
antidumping decrees in force across all GATT countries, 21 of those in South 
Africa (GATT, 1958, p. 14).  
Since 1995, when the Uruguay Round agreements came into force, use of 
antidumping has dominated use of other provisions that sanction import 
restrictions: 2049 antidumping measures as compared with 83 safeguard 
measures, 119 countervailing duty measures and no renegotiations reported by 
the WTO Secretariat.
20  Since the Uruguay Round agreements are in place 91 
percent of the applications of these traditional GATT flexibility provisions have 
been antidumping measures. 
While in GATT’s early decades renegotiation of previously agreed tariff bindings 
was the most frequently used flexibility provision, the ascendance of antidumping 
demonstrates that as the GATT/WTO system became more juridical, adjustments 
previously treated as negotiations were increasingly taken up as evaluations 
against specified criteria. 
These evaluations are unilateral in that they are conducted by national 
authorities, but they retain significant collective or international dimensions.  
Evaluation is against a collectively agreed ‘just cause’ (e.g., injurious dumping) 
and it follows collectively agreed procedures.  National investigations must 
recognize exporters and governments of exporting countries as interested parties 
and these investigations are under continuous international scrutiny.  
Antidumping measures have been the subject of 60 of the 368 cases
21 taken up 
in the WTO dispute settlement process. 
Discipline 
Though the number of antidumping measures applied has increased, the record 
indicates that there is a good deal of discipline in the GATT/WTO system.  
Finger, Nelson and Hall (1982) found that over 1975-79, only 2 percent of US 
imports were covered by either affirmative antidumping or countervailing duty 
cases; 4 percent by affirmative safeguard (Article XIX) cases.  Galloway, 
Bloningen and Flynn (1999) found that in the mid 1990s the percentage for the 
total of all three of these trade remedies was still about 5 percent.  Egger and 
Nelson (2007) looked at the impact of antidumping world-wide, estimated that 
over the 40 years 1960-2000 antidumping had reduced world export volume by 
no more than 2 percent. 
One discipline on antidumping is cost; the cost to an industry of legal 
representation and of supplying the information needed to support a petition 
along with the cost to a government of conducting an investigation.
22  Another 
                                         
20 These data cover 1 January 1995 through 31 December 2007. 
21 As of 06 January 2009. 
22 Finger – Nogués (2006) look into this matter.  Cost was an important consideration for 
industries in Latin America, as well as for governments.  Casual information in Washington, DC, 
  11discipline is reciprocity.  Though WTO rules do not require compensation when 
an antidumping duty is imposed, the threat of reciprocal antidumping action has 
become an effective discipline.  Though there was a surge of antidumping users 
and actions soon after the Uruguay Round, the number of cases subsequently 
declined.  Several studies have found that the threat of retaliation provides 
considerable discipline, hence the decline of the number of antidumping actions 
once a large number of WTO Members had armed themselves.  Blonigen and 
Bown (2003) summarize these arguments and evidence.  Eichengreen and Van 
der Ven (1985) document how threatened retaliation by the EEC caused the US 
government to pull back from taking antidumping action against imports of 
automobiles from Europe.  
An effective pressure valve 
Antidumping has proven to be an effective pressure valve.  It allows domestic 
interests to complain about the unfairness of foreign competition and provides a 
detailed process for investigation of such concerns.  At the same time, 
antidumping measures have been minor in comparison with the liberalization the 
global economy has witnessed. 
Guidance for good policy 
Antidumping is perhaps the classic example of a pragmatically successful 
flexibility instrument with pretensions – but no more than pretensions – to a real 
economic rational.  Functionally speaking however, antidumping’s contribution is 
that it has provided needed political flexibility.  The increasing technical 
complexity of its criteria act more as discipline against overuse than as 
determinants of when an intervention would be a good decision by the 
government. 
Developing country usage of GATT balance of payments 
provisions 
The GATT system imposes no restrictions on unilateral increases of unbound 
tariff rates and until the Uruguay Round developing countries had notified 
bindings on few of their tariff lines.
23  They therefore did not need the legalities 
of renegotiations, safeguards or antidumping in order to adjust tariff rates. 
GATT Article XI provides a general prohibition against quantitative restrictions, 
hence any application of such a restriction must find legal sanction in other 
provisions of the agreement.  Article XII allows quantitative restrictions as 
measures to guard the balance of payments, and in GATT’s earlier decades was 
                                                                                                                    
suggests that the legal costs of pursuing an antidumping case are well over one million dollars, 
for each plaintiff and each respondent. 
23 Finger, Ingco and Reincke (1996, p. 50) report that only 30 percent of developing country 
imports were in bound tariff lines.  The figure is likely an overstatement.  It is based on data 
submitted to the GATT by countries that are active in GATT affairs. 
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frequently cited by developed countries.  More relevant for developing countries 
however is Article XVIII.  Provisions under Article XVIIIB allow developing 
countries to impose quantitative restrictions to address balance of payments 
disequilibria and to maintain reserves adequate for development.  Section C of 
the same article allows protection to infant industries, or in GATT language, 
measures to promote the establishment of particular industries in the context of 
a development program.  In practice, the balance-of-payments exception has 
been invoked far more often than the infant industry exception: almost 3,500 
restrictions under the balance of payments exception compared with less than 
100 under the infant industry exception (Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1: Number of CCCN items notified under each GATT article by developing 
countries 1974-87 
Article cited as justification  Number
VIII: Fees and formalities connected with importation and 
exportation 
316 
XI.2: Restrictions to apply standards or classifications, manage 
short supplies or complement agricultural or fisheries support 
programs 
108 
XVIII: State trading enterprises  15 
XVIIIB: Balance of payments measures for developing countries  3,437 
XVIIIC: Industrial development  91 
XX: General exceptions  131 
XXI: National security  4 
Source: OECD 1992, p. 100. 
  14The paucity of actions notified under the infant industry provision should not be 
taken as an indication that developing country governments did not apply trade 
restrictions for this purpose.  Anjaria (1987, p. 671) concludes that the 
explanation for the larger number of measured notified under this provision is its 
easier procedural requirements.  Infant industry measures (Article XVIIIC) 
require prior notification to the GATT, and compensation for affected exporters.  
Article XVIIIC also provides that the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES can disapprove 
such an action and can authorize retaliation if a not-approved action in taken.  
Balance of payments measures (Article XVIIIB) are not subject to these 
restraints, nor are there time limits on how long they may be in place.  The facts 
of usage suggest that measures notified under Article XVIIIB were often 
intended to support particular industries rather than to restrict imports generally.  
Anjaria reports (1987, p. 680) that for each country the aggregate of measures 
notified under XVIIIB was made up of many different applications, and that for 
three-fourths of the developing countries that notified measures the aggregate 
covered less than half of the import categories. 
Rationale 
When the GATT was adopted the widely believed Prebisch thesis cautioned that 
commodity earnings would inexorably decline and industrialization would require 
vast imports of capital goods.  Thus developing countries would continuously 
suffer balance of payments problems.
24  Reflecting this thinking, GATT soon 
evolved a tolerance for developing country trade restrictions.
25 
Discipline  
Again we find reciprocity to be the effective discipline.  By the 1970s a number of 
developing countries had become important in world trade, both as potential 
export markets and as suppliers of imports that increasingly prompted developed 
country industries to call for protection.  The intensified commercial presence of 
developing countries provoked industrial countries to press for market-opening 
actions by developing countries.  Pressure was applied both through the GATT 
Balance of Payments Committee and the Trade Committee of the OECD.  One of 
the focal points of this pressure was reduced use by developing countries of 
Article XVIIIB restrictions. 
The Uruguay Round agreements include an understanding on balance of 
payments provisions intended to reduce overall use as well as to shift usage to 
tariffs instead of quantitative restrictions.  Under pressure of this agreement, 
developing countries have drastically reduced the number of measures justified 
under GATT’s balance of payments provision.  As Table 3.2 documents, 
                                         
24 Little (1982) is a good source on development thinking of that era. 
25 Hudec (1987) documents and analyzes this evolution. 
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26 WTO Balance of Payments Committee reports for 1995 and 1996 report balance of payments 
measures in place in 18 Members.  Subsequent Reports indicate that all such measures have 
been removed. Table 3.2: Numbers of Antidumping, Article XIX Safeguard and Countervailing Duty Measures Notified by WTO Members; 
1995-2007 




Antidumping Measures  119  92 125 170 185 227 167  214 220 152 132 137 109 2049 
Safeguard Measures  0  135579 1 4 1 5 6 6 7 58 3    
Countervailing duty 
Measures 19  5 3 6 14 19 14  14 6 8 4 3 4 119 
Developing Members  
Antidumping Measures  59  52 74 101 127 129 83  151 189 114 82 114 83 1358 
Safeguard Measures  0  03425784 4 5 7 55 4    
Countervailing duty 
M e a s u r e s   1 420207421 4 3 0 14 0      
Source: WTO website 
Note 1: * Over 1995-2007 only four percent of  total measures involved agricultural products, HS Categories I-II. 
Note 2: WTO Balance of Payments Committee Reports (WT/BOP/R/10 and WT/BOP/R/19) for 1995 and 1996 report balance of payments 
measures in place in 18 Members.  Subsequent Reports indicate that all such measures have been removed. 
 
 
  174. Lessons from liberalization  
A recent group of studies looked particularly at how developing country policy 
managers used safeguards and antidumping as part of their countries’ 
liberalization and reform programs.  The studies, covering Argentina, Brazil, Chili, 
Columbia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru, are summarized in Finger-Nogués 
(2008).
27  Rather than repeating that summary here, I will report only 
conclusions/lessons from the study, these to be applied below to the analysis of 
the proposed SSM. 
The GATT/WTO system of bindings and rules was critical to the success of the 
liberalization programs. 
In their economic histories, these countries had passed through several cycles of 
protection and openness.  Many different import control instruments were in use, 
among them tariffs, surcharges, benchmark customs values, enterprise-specific 
limits on foreign purchases, and import prohibitions. Application of restrictions 
was done through processes that allowed wide discretion to government officials, 
with decisions often made at the sectoral level. Safeguards and antidumping – as 
GATT and WTO rules define them – were rarely used. With almost all tariff lines 
unbound through the GATT/WTO, the legal sanction that use of such 
instruments would have provided was not needed. 
The binding of tariff rates in the Uruguay Round meant that only GATT/WTO 
mechanisms could be used to apply new restrictions.  This provided the basis in 
domestic politics for governments to eliminate the previous mechanisms and to 
maintain control over the management of new pressures for protection in 
agencies with economy-wide responsibilities and accountabilities. 
The motivation for reform was each government’s perception that reform and 
liberalization would benefit the people of the country. 
The mercantilist idea that liberalization was the ‘cost’ of advancing a country’s 
export interests played a minimal role.  The Asian example – growth and 
productivity through integration into the global economy – had considerable 
influence.  The officials who led the reforms saw the objective as achieving world 
levels of productivity by becoming a part of the global economy rather than by 
simply boosting their exports.  To them, GATT/WTO mechanisms were more 
about helping to manage reform than about forcing it.
28 
                                         
27 The country studies are also available as World Bank working papers, Finger – Nogués 2008 
provides references.  The summary and the country studies were also published as Finger – 
Nogués 2006. 
28 Among these seven countries, Mexico’s negotiation of a free trade agreement with Canada and 
the United States was the most prominent use of trade negotiations as a vehicle (though not 
necessarily a motive) for trade reform. 
  18Creating safeguard and antidumping mechanisms was often part of the bargain 
to gain industry acceptance of reform. 
Acceptance by industry of the idea that they could not only survive but prosper 
under the stimulus of international competition was paired with the promise that 
they would be protected from abnormal or unfair competition.  This was a 
political bargain, expressed in speeches and other such statements, often with 
reference to GATT/WTO rules and mechanisms as the standard for distinguishing 
what industry would and would not be expected to face up to. 
The administrative dimensions of GATT/WTO rules for trade remedies supported 
valuable managerial reforms. 
One of the objectives of the officials who led the reforms was to change the 
culture of policy management; from one based on relationships to one based of 
the facts of economic potential.  This relates particularly to such GATT/WTO 
rules as those on the recognition of and participation by interested parties, for 
open procedures according to previously announced processes, for publication of 
decisions and of reasons for decisions.  Notification requirements also proved 
valuable, they proved the basis for establishing an archive that allowed for 
continuing analysis of the impact of measures put in place.  The collection of the 
data and the keeping of such records was a matter of changing management 
culture as well as of allocating the necessary resources. 
The economics of the GATT/WTO flexibility provisions proved an unconstructive 
guide to managing the national economic interest. 
Particularly in creating safeguard mechanisms these governments attempted to 
create decision mechanisms that balanced the various domestic interests at play.  
Injury, the interests of displaced domestic production, was a basic element.  At 
the same time, the new safeguards mechanisms asked protection seekers to 
submit a recovery plan that would demonstrate that the industry asking relief 
would over the long term pull its own weight – not be a long-term burden on the 
rest of the economy.  Several of the governments studied provided also for a 
government agency to prepare a quantitative analysis of the impact of the 
requested protection on users of imported products, and made that information 
a part of the information base for a decision.
29  Peru required the petitioner to 
provide such analysis.  Chile and Costa Rica paid particular attention to how 
restricting imports would affect the competitiveness of the local industry. 
The managerial logic of including such factors in the decision process was first 
that it made economic sense to do so, and second, that having such information 
on the record would provide political support in those cases when the 
government concluded that a restrictive action would not be wise. 
                                         
29 GATT/WTO rules require an investigation and determination of injury before a safeguard or 
antidumping measure may be applied.  A positive finding on injury does not however mandate 
that a restrictive measure be applied; a government may take into consideration any other 
factors it considers relevant. 
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The fact that the WTO rules did not mandate consideration of such factors 
provided eventually leverage against reform.  Petitioners who were turned down 
on the basis of long-run viability or cost to user industries complained that the 
government was being more rigorous than the GATT/WTO required; that they 
were being subjected to a higher standard that was applied in the industrial 
countries who were the inventors of safeguards and antidumping.  Given that 
governments, in winning industry’s acceptance of reform programs, had referred 
to GATT/WTO rules as the relevant criteria, these complaints had considerable 
political bite. 
The Mexican government was subject to similar criticism when it attempted to 
base dumping investigations on operational techniques to determine the 
prevailing international price in competitive markets.  WTO rules sanction 
constructed cost formulas that allow generous overstatement of what normal 
business accounting practices would determine.  Under criticism from protection 
seekers and from international antidumping professionals, the Mexican 
government was forced to abandon a disciplined measure of competitive price 
that it had concluded would better serve the Mexican national economic interest.  
The generous ‘space’ provided by GATT/WTO safeguard and antidumping rules 
proved to support resistance for reform rather than to support the policy leaders’ 
case for it. 
GATT/WTO rules earn a high mark on support for good process, a lower mark on 
support for good criteria. 
Liberalization at times involved considerable short-term use of flexibilities.  
Chile for one year notified more countervailing duty investigations than any other 
country.  Mexico and Argentina, for short periods, initiated large numbers of 
antidumping investigations.  These high rates of usage took place in years of 
extraordinary economic stress, often involving overvalued exchange rates.  When 
crises had passed and the exchange rate adjusted, usage of the flexibility 
provisions fell back to levels comparable with those of other WTO Members. 
Build all of the interests that are relevant into the decision process.  This is 
perhaps the overall lesson from the study.  Adopting a technical approach to 
safeguard decisions was a key part of changing the decision culture, and 
GATT/WTO procedural rules were strongly supportive of adopting that approach.  
As noted above, when the GATT/WTO rules mandated a technical consideration 
only of the arguments for protection, they tended to support resistance to 
reform.  Moreover, they compromised the reformers’ confidence in a technical 
approach and thus their resolve to move trade policy decision-making away from 
‘politics as usual.’  GATT/WTO guidelines should do more than allow good 
economics, they should support it. 5. SPECIAL AGRICULTURAL SAFEGUARDS (SSG) 
The Uruguay Round agreements Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) provide for a 
‘special safeguard’
30 (SSG) that allows the imposition of an additional import duty 
in case of an import surge (volume trigger) or when the price of an import 
shipment falls markedly below historical prices (price trigger). 
The SSG is intended nominally to deal with problems liberalization of agriculture 
might create;
31 the SSG provisions to ‘remain in force for the duration of the 
reform process,’
32 but the agreement provides no end date for the reform 
process. Legally speaking, the SSG mechanism is in place until members, by 
formal agreement, end it.
33  
The provisions were agreed in conjunction with tariffication, and recourse to SSG 
is limited to those countries that undertook tariffication in line with Uruguay 
Round modalities and who, in their schedules, marked tariff lines on which each 
reserved the right to apply SSG measures.  Thirty-nine Members, 9 developed 
(counting the EC-15 as 1), 24 developing and 6 transition economies, reserved 
that right.
34  (The 6 transition economies have since become Member States of 
the EC-27.)  The share of agricultural tariff lines so reserved ranged from 66 
percent for Poland to 1 percent for Indonesia.
35  Many developing Members 
tariffied by adopting ceiling bindings and are thus not eligible to apply SSG 
measures, some who did designate products as SSG-eligible complain that the 
complexity of the formulas and the data requirements make the SSG system 
difficult to use.  For whatever reason, few developing Members are in the list of 
users provided in Annex 1. 
I review briefly in this section the design and application of the SSG system, 
Annex 1 provides details. 
Properties of the SSG 
The price trigger allows every import shipment to be screened against previously 
determined and posted trigger prices.  Major users of the system (e.g., the EEC 
the Rep. of Korea, the United States) posted trigger prices in 1995, when the 
                                         
30 Agreement on Agriculture, Article 5, titled “Special Safeguard Provisions.’ 
31 Article 5.9 specifies that the SSG  provisions ‘shall remain in force for the duration of the 
reform process as determined under Article 20.’  Article 20 notes agreement to continue the 
negotiating process, but provides no end date for ‘the reform process.’ 
32 AoA Article 5.9 
33 The December agriculture Chairs paper (WTO 2008b, paragraphs 126, 127) calls for 
elimination of developed Member’s application within 7 years of entry into force of a Doha Round 
agreement, for tightened limits on use by developing Members. 
34  WTO document G/AG/NG/S/9 Table 2.   
35 WTO document G/AG/NG/S/9 Table 2.   
  21Uruguay Round agreements came into effect.
36  Because the trigger prices are 
averages for 1986-88, they need not be revised year-by-year.  Any exporter, 
aware that an additional duty will be added if her price is below that posted 
price, has therefore the incentive to price at that level.  The price-trigger system 
can function thus as a minimum price system. 
As to inference that might be drawn from research on similar economic 
instruments, the behavior of exporters whose products are under antidumping 
order provides insight into what the effect of the published trigger prices might 
be.  (They face the similar choice between pricing at the ‘no dumping’ level or 
having an antidumping duty increase their delivered price by the same amount.)  
Blonigen and Park (2004) found that exporters under antidumping order do 
typically raise prices so as to avoid paying antidumping duties.
37 
The volume trigger functions as a second stage tariff-rate quota (TRQ).  The 
volume trigger allows a Member to screen each year’s imports against the 
average of imports over the previous three years.  Once the trigger is reached (a 
certain percentage over the three year average) the Member is clear to add an 
additional duty – above the bound duty rate.  The stages of tariff application are 
thus the following.  (1) Up to the TRQ volume, imports would enter at a low or 
zero rate.  (2) Once the TRQ volume of imports is reached, the ordinary duty 
may be applied.  (3) Once the volume trigger is reached the ordinary duty plus 
the SSG additional duty may be applied. 
Procedural requirements are minimal.  The AoA obligates Members to operate 
SSG ‘in a transparent manner’ and to ‘afford
 any interested Members the 
opportunity to consult with it in respect of the conditions of application of such 
action.’
38  It provides however no specifications on recognition of interested 
parties nor on procedure.  Notification requirements provide minimal information 
on impact.  The period over which a product was subject to SSG action must be 
notified, but Members are not required to notify the amounts of imports on 
which additional duties were levied nor the amounts of these additional duties.  
An example of the ambiguity of the information that satisfies the AoA’s 
notification requirements is the content of EEC notifications.  Year-by-year the 
EEC notifies the tariff lines for which ‘the volume-based] system has been made 
operational’ and year-by-year the EEC notifies that ‘volume-based action has not 
been invoked.’ 
The limits on application of SSG measures are entirely technical: only on tariff 
lines previously marked, only if the invoice price of a shipment is below the 
posted trigger prices or the volume in a year exceeds the trigger level based on 
previous years’ imports.  Multilateral oversight is the same as oversight for 
                                         
36 Chinese Taipei acceded to the WTO on 1 April 2002.  On 2 April 2002 Chinese Taipei notified 
upfront trigger prices on 77 tariff lines, volume-based measures on 5 tariff lines. 
37 Another alternative, pointed out by Will Martin, is over-invoicing. 
38 AoA Article 5.7.  
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observance of bound rates: did the rate applied fall within the country’s bindings; 
those bindings appropriately calculated to take into account the trigger formulas?  
In comparison with the other safeguard provisions in the GATT/WTO and their 
tradition of use, the SSG is a technical detail of tariff bindings rather than a 
safeguard or flexibility provision.  
Application of measures 
Over the life of the SSG mechanism, agricultural prices have been generally 
above their level in the 1986-88 base period for trigger prices (Figure 5.1) and 
relatively few SSG measures have been notified.  Judging from notifications to 
the WTO, Members have applied SSG measures to few of the tariff lines on 
which they reserved the right to do so, and even on these tariff lines to a small 
percentage of shipments.  Usage has tended to be for extended periods of time; 
many of the products protected by SSG measures have been under such 
protection for almost all of the years the mechanism has been in place.  One 
might have expected more price-based measures when agricultural prices were 
lower, but no such pattern appears in the data. 
The SSG has functioned not as an allowance for occasional response to unusual 
situations but as an expansion of the limits a Member has accepted through its 
tariff bindings.  Annex 1 provides details of SSG measures Members have 



















Source: World Bank Development Prospects Group web data. 
 
  246. SPECIAL SAFEGUARDS (SSM) – THE PROPOSALS 
Several factors lie behind the Doha Round’s consideration of a new Special 
Safeguard Mechanism (SSM).  One of these was developed countries pressure 
for increased access to developing country markets as quid pro quo for 
developed country concessions on agriculture and on manufactures.  Significant 
reductions of developing country bound rates would be required, developed 
countries insisted, because developing countries’ bound rates were on average 
higher than those of developed countries, and much higher than their applied 
rates. (Table 6-1)  Developing countries, on the other hand, had experienced 
significant increases of agricultural imports over the 1990s and into the 21
st 
century.
39  They insisted that they would need a safeguard mechanism to help 
with the adjustment to lower tariff rates. 
In the background was the continuing concern to pay particular attention to 
issues of concern to developing countries, this signaled by the Members having 
accepted the label “Doha Development Agenda” for the work program. 
 
Table 6-1: Average post Uruguay Round applied and bound tariff rates on 
agricultural products; ad valorem equivalents 
Country group  Applied  Bound
High income countries  15.0  41.9 
Developing countries except LDC  13.4  53.9 
Least developed countries   12.5  94.1 
Source: Martin and Mattoo (2008, 5) 
 
A possible alternative to creating a second agricultural safeguard was that 
developing countries obtain access to the SSG by, say, allowing a new period for 
notification of the tariff lines on which Members reserve SSG application.  This 
alternative however attracted little support.  There were complaints that the 
SSG’s complex formulas were difficult to apply and that the 1986-88 base for 
price triggers was increasingly out of date.  Furthermore, a sense of fairness 
suggested that while the developed countries had had more or less exclusive 
access to the SSG during their period of adjustment, developing countries should 
likewise have an exclusive instrument during theirs. 
The proposals 
The major proposals tabled have been those of the draft agricultural modalities 
working document for the July 2008 WTO meetings, the December 2008 high-
                                         
39 FAO 2003 and Jales 2005 and references cited in these papers. 
  25level WTO meeting that did not take place
40 (‘Draft Modalities’) and of the G-
33.
41  The G-33 proposal accepts more or less the structure of the Draft 
Modalities, differences are mainly over the parameters.  While application of 
additional duties under the SSG is limited to tariff lines that were tariffied and 
marked in a Member’s schedule, the SSM would have no a priori product 
limitations.
42  A basic limitation is that pre Doha Round rates will be a ceiling – 
the normal duty plus the SSM duty cannot exceed the pre Doha Round bound 
rate.
43  The major remaining differences on parameters are on those that define 
the extent of exceptions to this limit. 
Volume trigger 
The SSM volume trigger would authorize an additional duty if in any year the 
volume of imports exceeds (by a certain percentage) the average volume over 
the previous three years.
44  The schedule below gives the amounts of the 
additional duty:  
Volume of Imports relative to the 
previous three year average (percent) 
Allowed increase of tariff rate: 
the higher of 
>110;  ≤ 115  25 per cent of the current bound tariff 
or 25 percentage points 
>115;  ≤ 135  40 per cent of the current bound tariff 
or 40 percentage points 
>135  50 per cent of the current bound tariff 
or 50 percentage points 
At any time in a year that the volume quota was reached, the SSM duty could be 
applied for the remainder of the year.  
Draft Modalities and G-33 do not differ on these parameters.  However, a 
notable difference is that Draft Modalities would limit the volume calculation to 
MFN imports, the application of the remedy to MFN imports.
45  G-33 would 
include preferential trade in both. 
                                         
40 WTO 2008a and 2008b.  The paragraphs on the SSM are identical in the July and December 
modalities papers, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3 and TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4.  There is however a second 
December modalities paper, TN/AG/W/7, that deals with certain dimensions of the SSM, 
particularly with the pre-Doha bound tariff as the upper limit and with the treatment of seasonal 
products.  These differences will be taken up later in the section. 
41 G-33, Africa Group and ACPs 2008. 
42 WTO 2008b, paragraph 132. 
43 WTO 2008b, paragraph 142. 
44 Each Member would specify the calendar, fiscal or marketing year (12-month period) over 
which it would administer the volume-based SSM.  
45 WTO 2008b, paragraph 138.  The paragraphs on the SSM are identical in the July and 
December modalities papers, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3 and TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4.  There is however a 
second December modalities paper, TN/AG/W/7, that deals with certain dimensions of the SSM, 
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Draft Modalities propose that volume-based measures be limited in duration to a 
maximum of 12 months, or for a seasonal product the length of the marketing 
season (maximum 6 months).  Reapplication would require a new trigger 
calculation, but Draft Modalities add the limit ‘no product shall be subject to the 
volume-based SSM consecutively for more than two periods and where such 
consecutive application has occurred this may not be resorted to again before 
the elapse of a further two consecutive periods..’ (paragraph 140)  G-33 would 
not impose the two-year limit.  Determining the trigger level for a year 
immediately after one in which an SSM measure was applied follows the 
standard formula; i.e., the average over the three previous years, including the 
one in which the SSM measure was in place.  However, where this would have 
the effect of lowering the three year rolling average below the level which 




A price-based SSM measure may be applied to any import shipment whose price 
is below a trigger price.  The trigger price will be equal to 85 percent of the 
reference price, the reference ‘price’ being the average of monthly MFN-sourced 
import unit-values for that product for the most recent three-year period for 
which data are available.  (WTO 2008b, paragraph 135) 
Draft modalities require that ‘[t]he trigger price shall be publicly disclosed and 
available to the extent necessary to allow other Members to assess the additional 
duty that may be levied.’ (WTO 2008b, paragraph 135, footnote 50)  This 
parallels the information requirement for the SSG.  It does not specify how far in 
advance of application trigger prices must be ‘publicly disclosed,’ nor does it 
require that they be notified to the WTO.  A country might however post up-front 
trigger prices, as did several Members under the SSG, and operate in effect a 
minimum price system.  As to what SSG experience has been, other than the up-
front postings of SSG trigger prices taken up in the previous section, the first 
notification to the WTO of SSG trigger prices has been as part of after-the-fact 
notification of SSG measures applied. 
Draft Modalities propose that the SSM duty be limited to 85 percent of the 
difference between the shipment price and the trigger price.    [E.g., if the 
reference price = 100, the trigger price is then 85.  If the price of a shipment 
was 75, the additional duty would be 0.85x(85-75) = 8.5.  The ‘normal’ duty 
would also be applied.]  Figure 6.1 illustrates how the delivered price (shipment 
price plus additional duty) would vary as the shipment price fell. 
                                                                                                                    
particularly with the pre-Doha bound tariff as the upper limit and with the treatment of seasonal 
products.  These differences will be taken up later in the section. 






















Base Period Price = 100
Shipment Price + SSM duty
Shipment price
  28The G-33 statement proposes that the trigger price be 90 percent of the 
reference price, the allowed additional duty be ‘100 percent compensation of the 
price difference.’
47  Following the nomenclature of the Draft Modalities 
document, this would mean 100 percent of the difference between the trigger 
price and the shipment price.  
Again parallel to the SSG, any Member taking an SSM action must notify the 
WTO, indicating the tariff lines affected by the SSM duty ‘as far in advance as 
may be practicable or, where this is not possible, no later than 15 days after the 
implementation of such action.’  The applying member must also provide 
interested Members ‘the opportunity to consult with it in respect of the 
conditions of application of such action.’ (WTO 2008b, paragraph 141) 
Pre-Doha bound rates as limits 
The Draft Modalities would impose pre Doha Round Agreement bound rates as 
an upper limit on duties that might be applied – on the sum of the post-Doha 
bound rate and the SSM additional duty.  Exceptions would be allowed, but 
Members have expressed significant disagreements on the parameters.  
Proposals on the table have two basic parameters: (a) the number of products 
on which the pre-Doha Agreement bound rate could be exceeded by the ordinary 
duty plus the SSM additional duty and (b) the size of the SSM duty, based on the 
then current (i.e., post Doha Agreement) bound rate: 
Group  Draft Modalities (Dec 2008)
a  G-33
b 
Least developed countries  (a) no limit on how many 
products  
(b) the larger of 40 percent or 
40 percentage points ad 
valorem 
(a) no limit on how many 
products  
(b) the larger of 100 percent 
or 100 percentage points ad 
valorem 
Small Vulnerable Economies  (a) in any given period, 
maximum of [10-15] per cent 
of tariff lines  
(b) the larger of 20 percent or 
20 percentage points ad 
valorem 
(a) in any given period, 
maximum of 30 per cent of 
tariff lines  
(b) the larger of 75 percent or 
75 percentage points ad 
valorem 
Other Developing Countries   (a) in any given period, 
maximum of [2-6] HS 6-digit 
products, each entailing no 
more than [4-8] tariff lines  
(b) the larger of 15 percent or 
15 percentage points ad 
valorem, 
not permissible for two 
consecutive periods 
(a) in any given period, 
maximum of 7 per cent of 
tariff lines  
(b) the larger of 30 percent or 
30 percentage points ad 
valorem 
 
                                         
47 G-33 et all 2008, paragraphs 11 and 12, and comments reported below in other sources. 
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Notes: a.  WTO 2008c; b.  G-33 2008. 7. SPECIAL SAFEGUARDS (SSM) AS POLICY DECISION RULES 
From the perspective of developing countries’ interests, an SSM or any other 
trade policy mechanism should not be judged by the frequency with which it 
would allow import restrictions.  It should be judged by how effectively it 
distinguished instances in which restriction was the better choice from instances 
in which to not restrict was the choice that better advanced the developing 
country’s interests. 
The first paragraphs of this paper reminded the reader that imposing an import 
restriction sometimes can be the correct choice.  To not restrict might force an 
unnecessary burden on resources whose long-run comparative advantage does 
lie in agriculture, or force other resources out more rapidly than alternative 
income-earning possibilities develop. 
On the side of not acting is the need to maintain constructive pressure on the 
sector to modernize.  In developing countries as well as in developed countries 
the cost of agricultural support is considerable.  For example, the 2008 WTO 
Trade Policy Review for Korea reports that ‘Korea's net agricultural support 
exceeds the sector's GDP contribution (3.3% versus 3.2% in 2006).
48 
Also on this side of the issue are the interests of the food consumers and an 
increase of food prices is a significant reduction of real income.  Mistakes on the 
side of restricting can be costly.  For example, the WTO’s 2007 Trade Policy 
Review for Indonesia reports that ‘[t]he two thirds of farming households in 
Indonesia who are net consumers of rice were adversely affected when the 
Government announced a seasonal import restriction on rice from January 2004, 
which has been extended repeatedly and effectively become permanent.
 49 
In the following subsections I present the results of two simulations that look at 
the SSM from the perspective of a guideline for when an import restriction would 
or not be the correct policy choice. 
Identifying incidents of price undercutting 
Raul Q. Montemayor (2008) has conducted a sophisticated simulation exercise to 
better understand how the proposed SSM would perform.  Though his primary 
objective is different from determining when the mechanism would make the 
correct choice between imposing versus not imposing an import restriction, his 
results do provide considerable insight on that issue. 
Montemayor applied the proposed SSM rules to historical data; his data base 
included monthly imports mostly from 2000 to 2005 of six countries: China, 
Ecuador, Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines and Senegal. 
                                         
48 WTO Document WT/TPR/S/204, page 90.) 
49 WTO document WT/TPR/S/184, page 67. 
  31He begins his analysis by identifying ‘problematic months,’ of serious price-
undercutting, in which the price of imports including the full bound duty was 10 
percent or more below the domestic price of the product.  He them applied the 
proposed rules for the SSM price and volume triggers to determine when these 
triggers would allow an additional duty.  The simulation covered potentially 432 
‘months’ – 6 countries times 6 years times 12 months/year – though there were 
months in which one country or another recorded no imports for some products. 
I summarize his findings below, focusing on the two types of error associated 
with managerial decision rules:
50 
  Type 1: to not act when action is the correct decision 
  Type 2: to act when not acting is the correct decision.  
Basic outcome: Problematic months and SSM duties triggered (price plus volume 
triggers) 
as percentages of total number of ‘months’  
 Percentage 
Problematic 49 
SSM duty triggered   46 
SSM duty triggered in a Problematic Month  22 
 
Accuracy 1: Instances of serious price undercutting (problematic months) in 
which the SSM triggered action versus when it did not, as percentages of total 
number of ‘months’  
 Percentage 
Problematic months  49 
In which:   
SSM duty triggered   22 
SSM duty not triggered  27 
 
Accuracy 2: Instances in which action was prescribed when it was correct 
(problematic months) versus when it was not, as percentages of total number of 
‘months’ 
 Percentage 
SSM duty triggered:  46 
In a month that was:   
Problematic   22 
Not problematic  24 
                                         
50 The numbers that follow are from Montemayor’s ‘base case,’ in which the minimum increase of 
imports required to trip the volume trigger is 5 percent over the previous three year average.  
The ‘base case’ price trigger is 70 percent of the average over the past three years. 
  32Judged by either managerial standard, the trigger mechanisms perform poorly.   
  In more than half of the instances in which there was a problem, action was 
not triggered.  
  More than half the time an action was triggered there was no need for it. 
Related findings from the past
51 
This finding – that rules to ‘fill in’ with policy remedies in ‘exceptional’ years are 
likely to be inaccurate – is not an isolated one.  Studies sparked by an earlier, 
1970s, concern to deal with the instability of receipts from primary products 
produced similar results.  Considerable research was done to simulate the 
behavior of buffer stocks that would stabilize prices by selling when the price 
was above then long-run trend line, buying when it was below.  These studies 
likewise found that workable decision rules to identify when to buy or when to 
sell were difficult to devise.  Even when predictions of future prices (on which 
buy/sell decisions depended) were bases on sophisticated regressions – over 
many or few past years – the buffer stock turned out in retrospect to be on then 
wrong side of the market as often as on the correct. 
Analysis of a more ‘macro’ instrument, the IMF’s Compensatory Finance Facility, 
produced a similar conclusion.  The intent of the CFF is to lend to countries when 
their export receipts are below trend, the countries repay in above trend years.  
Over the long term, export receipts net of borrowings and repayments should 
then be more stable than ‘raw’ receipts.  Analysis revealed that net receipts were 
in fact less stable.  The problem again was the difficulty of deciding in any year if 
that was an above-trend or a below-trend year.  More than half of borrowings 
had been in years in which export receipts had been above trend. 
Another problem – more political perhaps than economic – these studies 
identified was that price cycles tended to be longer than the politics behind the 
support for policy instruments seemed to presume.  Commodity agreements, the 
political tradition was, had a life of five years, then were renegotiated.  Analysis 
indicated that an agreement would sometimes have to stay on the same side of 
the market (always buying or always selling) for longer than that.  The possibility 
that international politics would be strong enough to support such action was 
unlikely. 
SSG measures, likewise, have been applied more-or-less continuously to the 
same products over the 12-year history of the instrument.  This point is 
documented in Annex 1. 
Valdés and Foster (2005, p. 16), in their extended study of a possible SSM, also 
caution about the difficulty of accurately separating instability from trend.  They 
consider this problem to provide sufficient opportunity for misuse that they 
suggest a rule-of-thumb limit on the number of years a measure might remain in 
                                         
51 The work in the following three paragraphs is presented in more detail in Finger, 2002, 
chapters 6 and 7. 
  33place.  They also caution (p. 2 and p. 14) that the politics of the SSG presumed 
shorter departures from trend than world markets tend to produce. 
Differences by provenance of unit values: another source of 
mistaken signals 
(This section was prepared by J. Michael Finger and Francis Ng.) 
The SSM price trigger takes unit values aggregated over imports from all sources 
as the trigger or reference price, though in real-world commerce, unit values 
differ considerably from one source to another.  Thus, even though the price 
from a source may be constant, the price trigger will allow additional duties on 
imports from that source.
52 
Because unit values of imports from developing countries are often lower than 
those of imports from developed countries, using as triggers unit values 
calculated from imports from all sources will introduce a bias against developing 
country exporters.  To develop an indication of how large this bias might be, we 
compared for a sample of developing country importers (Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Mexico) the unit values of imports from different 
countries.  The experiment covers these six importing countries and twenty-five 
6-digit product lines.   All of the data were for calendar year 2006 – we were 
comparing unit values from one source with unit values from other sources, not 
unit values in one year with unit values in previous years.  The ‘restrictions’ that 
this experiment will trigger result entirely from differences in prices from one 
source to another, not from declines of prices over time. 
The exercise then is about identifying unintended consequences of the proposed 
trigger mechanism, particularly that: 
  Even if prices are unchanging over time, the price trigger as proposed will 
authorize a considerable number of restrictions. 
  Most of these restrictions will be on imports from developing countries. 
For each of these countries as importers, we calculated for each HS 6-digit line in 
agriculture the following: 
  The unit value of imports from all sources combined 
                                         
52 This point is easier to explain with an example.  Suppose imports in the base year include 
shipments from two different sources, A and B, as follows: 
Source Volume  Value  Unit  value 
A 100  $1000  $10.00 
B 100  $1500  $15.00 
Aggregate 200  $2500  $12.50 
The aggregate unit value, the reference price is based is $12.50.   
Suppose in the next year, shipments are identical.  The unit value from A is 20 percent below the 
reference price, hence an additional duty would be triggered. 
 
  34  The unit value of imports from each source (e.g., China imported soya beans 
from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Japan, Korea Republic, Taiwan China, the 
United States, and Uruguay). 
We then screened imports, by country of origin, to identify those where unit 
values were less than 85 percent of the unit value from all sources.
53 
This application – action against imports triggered when the unit value of imports 
is 15 percent or more below the unit value of imports from all sources – would 
allow the following numbers of actions by the six developing country importers 
over whose imports the experiment was conducted: 
Importer 




Percentage of HS 
lines (by country) 
with at least one 
restriction 
 Developed Developing  
Brazil 5  9  45 
China 15  24  65 
India 10  18  59 
Indonesia 30  49 65 
Mexico 11  9  39 
Malaysia 12  34  87 
All Six Countries  83  143  59 
Note: a.  An action is an additional duty on imports from one country on an 
individual tariff line. 
The preponderance of the restrictions this simulation identifies – 143 out of 226 
– would be on imports from developing countries.  The trigger would allow a 
restriction on imports from at least one country of origin on at least 39 percent 
of tariff lines – on average over the six countries on 59 percent of the tariff lines 
for which these countries had positive amounts of imports in 2006.
54  
This is a flexibility larger than that provided for ‘Special Products’ and ‘Sensitive 
Products’ in the tariff negotiations.  The tariff modalities allow for special 
treatment by developing Members of up to one-third of tariff lines as Sensitive 
Products, up to 12 percent as Special Products.
55 
Another comparison, the Draft Modalities suggest that the SSM be limited to 
breaching current bound rates on no more than 6 percent of tariff lines, the G-33 
proposal would set this limit at 7 percent of tariff lines.  The experiment thus 
                                         
53 We did the same exercise with a trigger price 10 percent below the all-source unit value and 
came up with negligibly different results. 
54 Additional results of these simulations are presented in Annex 3. 
55 WTO 2008b, paragraphs 72 and 129.  
  35shows that there is enough ‘noise’ in trade data to more than overwhelm 
whatever economic content the SSM formulas might intend.
56 
8. SSM AS PART OF THE MARKET ACCESS ISSUE 
Though Director-General Pascal Lamy singled out the SSM as the issue on which 
the July 2008 WTO meetings foundered, it is difficult to separate the SSM from 
the other parts of the agricultural negotiations.  Tentative agreement on 
modalities for tariff reduction formulas and exceptions may have been more a 
matter of shifting problems to the SSM discussions than of resolving them. 
Tariff rates 
Not only do agricultural tariff rates differ markedly from one WTO Member to 
another, bound rates for a number of Members are many percentage points 
above applied rates.  Differences are as pronounced among developing Members 
or among developed as between the groups.  Among developed Members,  the 
spread between bound and applied rates is near zero for several, above 60 
percentage points for others.  Among developing Members, the spread is near 
zero for China and the three Chinese customs territories treated as separate 
WTO Members (Hong Kong, China; Macau, China and Chinese Taipei); 80 
percentage points for India, over 100 percentage points for a number of others. 
(Annex 4 enumerates tariff rates and bound-applied spreads.) 
The large bound-applied spreads mean that reductions of bound rates (the coin 
of GATT/WTO negotiations) will have to be large relative to the level of cuts 
achieved in previous rounds if market access is to be enhanced – applied rates 
reduced.  Because the spread between bound rates and applied rates varies 
considerably among Members at comparable levels of development, 
arithmetically equal reductions of bound rates will have a greater bite for some 
than for comparable Members. 
Differences among Members in the present spread between bound and applied 
rates also mean that pre-Doha Agreement bound rates as limits on SSM 
application will mean more stringent limits on some Members than on others. 
Tariff formula and flexibilities 
The tentatively modalities provide tariff reduction formulas are complex and 
‘flexibilities’ that allow each Member considerable latitude to exclude products 
from the formula reductions – as special or sensitive products.  Martin and 
Mattoo’s analysis indicates that the flexibilities have the potential to reduce the 
                                         
56 A recent analysis by de Gorter, Kliauga and Nassar (2009) applied the price formula of the July 
2008 modalities to the imports of India, China, Korea and Indonesia over the period 1998-2003.  
They report (Table 3) that the formula would have authorized SSM duties on 6 percent of these 
countries’ agricultural imports from developed countries, as compared with 25 percent of imports 
from least developed countries and 10 percent of imports from developing countries.   
  36concessions by higher income countries by more than half, to almost eliminate 
reductions of applied rates by developing countries (Table 8.1). 
The ‘flexibilities’ in the agricultural modalities are considerably larger than those 
in the market access negotiations on non-agricultural merchandise (NAMA).  
Table 8.2 shows, for example, that while the agricultural flexibilities would allow 
developing Members to take back 59 percent of the reduction of agricultural 
bound rates, NAMA flexibilities would allow a take back of only 11 percent of the 
formula reduction.   
This means that much of the bargaining in agriculture will be over which 
products each country names as its special or sensitive products.  Though the 
modalities suggest that each Member will unilaterally name these products, there 
has been in fact hard bargaining over which countries will name which products 
as special or sensitive.
57 
Agreed formulas and other modalities state political commitment but not legal 
obligation.  In the end, a Member’s legal obligation will be specified not by these 
modalities but by the schedule of tariff rates the Member submits.  There is no 
provision in the modalities for an neutral reviewing of schedules for compliance 
with the tariff-cutting formulas nor with the modalities’ standards for and limits 
on excepting products from the formula cuts.  This screening will be done 
individually by Members, determinations about whose or which parts of 
schedules comply with agreed modalities will be part of the negotiations.  
It is indeed a possibility that because of their generous flexibilities the modalities 
do not advance the market access negotiations for agricultural products; they 
may instead transfer it to a yet-to-come negotiation focused on the schedules 
that each Member in the end will notify as its legal obligation.  In turn, it may 
not be possible to complete the SSM negotiations until Members have a more 
precise idea of the tariff schedules from which the SSM will allow exceptions. 
 
Table 8.1 Summary of the impact of the December 2008 draft agricultural 















High income countries  15  -7.5 3.5  4 
Developing non-LDC  13.4  -1.9 1.8  0.1 
LDCs 12.5  -0.3 0.3  0 
Source: Calculated from Martin-Mattoo, 2008, Table 1. 
Note: The base rates are ad valorem equivalents of rates applied in 2004, with 
adjustments for internationally-binding commitments to reform; e.g., Ukraine’s 
                                         
57 See for example the discussion in Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest 10
th December 2008. 
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accession commitments. The figures for changes are for percentage points 
reduction, e.g., from 15% ad valorem to 9% ad valorem would be -6.0, a 
reduction of 6 percentage points. 
 
Table 8.2: Summary of the impact of the December 2008 draft agricultural and 
NAMA
a modalities; Flexibilities take-back as percentage of the formula cut 
Applied Rates  Bound Rates 
  Agriculture   NAMA  Agriculture   NAMA 
High income countries  47  0  36  20 
Developing non-LDC  95  50  59  11 
Source: Calculated from Martin-Mattoo, 2008 Table 1. 
Note: a Non-Agricultural Market Access 
9. CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS 
The strength of traditional GATT/WTO flexibility provisions is that they have 
allowed adjustment within a system that provides for general pressure toward 
liberalization – flexibility to take restrictive action within a system that provides 
general discipline not to do so.  The effectiveness of GATT/WTO safeguard or 
flexibility provisions to sustain long-run liberalization programs stems from their 
requiring objective, transparent and participatory national decisions on the 
application of new/exceptional import restrictions.  Their usefulness does not 
stem from the ‘formulas’ they have provided, e.g., injury or injurious dumping. 
The proposed SSM (like the existing SSG) includes no procedural requirements; 
defines by arithmetic formulas when a Member may impose a new import 
restriction.  The formulas expand Members’ scope for imposing restrictions but 
they provide a poor guide as to when it makes sense to do so.  Simulations 
indicate that the formulas frequently prescribe action when it is not needed, 
frequently fail to prescribe action when it is appropriate. To the extent that the 
proposed SSM is more than a defense of Members’ latitude to unilaterally 
increase their tariff rates, it is bad guidance on when to do so – or not to do so. 
Even without the proposed SSM, the tentatively agreed flexibilities to name 
special and sensitive products provide great scope to avoid the tariff reductions 
the agricultural formula would otherwise imply.  Such modalities suggest lack of 
agreement rather than agreement on what liberalization Members will undertake.  
Failure to agree on the additional flexibilities the SSM would provide is part of 
this broader lack of agreement. 
The current pause in the Doha Round negotiations provides an opportunity to 
think farther about what the negotiations are about.  In the spirit of general 
commitment to policies that will support development, I offer two comments. 
The first is to remind all of us, analysts and negotiators, that the objective of a 
safeguard provision is to support good choices over bad rather than to support 
restriction over liberalization, or vice versa.  In the mercantilist environment of a 
trade negotiation it is easy to slip into a mercantilist perspective.  While I have used Montemayor’s (2008) results to gauge how well the SSM triggers would 
separate appropriate action from inappropriate, the criterion he himself applies is 
how often developing countries would be allowed to impose additional duties, 
e.g., ‘slightly higher volume and price thresholds ... would not seriously 
compromise access rates.’ (p. 11)  By this standard, the ideal parameters are 
those without limit on magnitude of remedy or on when remedy can be applied.  
The criterion of accuracy – how often the SSM as a decision rule would indicate 
the correct versus the incorrect decision – slips out of consideration. 
The exchange of SSM proposals in Geneva has been captured by the same 
mentality: exporters submitting proposals that would allow fewer SSM 
restrictions, importers submitting proposals than would allow more.  Functionally 
speaking, this is part of the market access negotiations – agreeing the limits 
beyond which each government reserves the right to unilateral action – rather 
than an attempt to design a policy decision mechanism. 
If the SSM discussion is about creating an effective safeguard mechanism then it 
should be about creating a good management tool.  That management tool 
should help a government to reach a correct decision and to sustain that decision 
among its various constituencies.  This suggests that the discussion should be 
about process rather than about criteria/formulas, particularly about finding a 
role for interested parties so that they have a sense of ownership/acceptance of 
whatever decision is reached. 
A second comment relates to the number of objects at play relative to the limited 
policy instrument the SSM mechanism will provide. 
The SSM negotiations reflect a multiplicity of concerns/objectives; among them: 
  Allowing policy response to departures from trends but not to trends 
  The length of departures from trends 
  Allowing policy response to random short-term variations but not to regular 
or seasonal short-term variations 
  Food security 
  The pace of shifting resources from agriculture to other sectors 
  The wisdom of imposing year-to-year adjustments on resources that have 
comparative advantage in agriculture. 
Viewed from an unflattering perspective, the SSM negotiations are an attempt to 
reduce the set of management tools needed address these concerns to an 
arithmetic formula for tariff rates.  This view brings forward the SSM negotiations 
as an example of a problem that Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian (2009) 
have presented in a broader context: the Doha Round has taken on an agenda 
trivial to the problems the international community now faces.  The tool set to 
which the negotiators have limited themselves may be inadequate to manage the 
issues, complications and interactions at hand – an attempt to control the side 
effects of remedies not outlined for problems not taken up. 
  3910.  REFERENCES 
Balassa, Bela. 1982. The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries, 
Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Blonigen, Bruce A. and Jee-Hyeong Park. 2004. ‘Dynamic Pricing in the Presence 
of Antidumping Policy: Theory and Evidence,’ American Economic Review, 
vol. 94, no 2, pp. 134-54. 
Blonigen, Bruce A. and Chad Bown. 2003. ‘Antidumping and retaliation threats,’ 
Journal of International Economics,  vol. 60, no. 2, pp. 249-73. 
BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest - Vol. 12, Number 31 24
th September 2008, 
‘G-7 FAILS TO FIND CONSENSUS ON SSM,’ electronic edition.  
Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest. 2008. ‘Revised Ag Text Reflects Progress, 
But Final Deal Still Elusive.’ Volume 12, Number 42,  10 December 2008,  
de Gorter, Harry, Erika Kliauga and Andre Nassar. 2009. How Current  Proposals 
on the SSM in the Doha Impasse Matter for Developing Country Exporters, 
ICONE Working Paper 03/02/09 (January 2009) Accessed 1 April 2009 at 
http://www.iconebrasil.org.br/arquivos/noticia/1741.pdf 
Egger, Peter and Douglas Nelson. 2007. ‘How Bad is Antidumping?: Evidence 
from Panel Data,’ Research Paper 2007/17, Leverhulme Center, University 
of Nottingham. 
Eichengreen, Barry  and Hans Van der Ven. 1985. U.S. Antidumping Policies: the 
Case of Steel, NBER Working Paper No. W1098, February 1985 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). 2003. Some Trade Policy Issues 
Relating to Trends in Agricultural Imports in the Context of Food Security, 
CCP 03/10, Sixty fourth Session of the Committee on Commodity 
Problems, 18-21 March 2003. 
Finger, J. Michael and Julio J. Nogués .2008. Safeguards and Antidumping in 
Latin American Trade Liberalization, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 4680, July. 
Finger, J. Michael and Julio J. Nogués .2006. Safeguards and Antidumping in 
Latin American Trade Liberalization: Fighting Fire with Fire, Washington, 
DC, The World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan. 
Finger, J. Michael. 2002. Institutions and Trade Policy, Edward Elgar. 
Finger, J. Michael and Ludger Schuknecht. 2001. ‘Market Access Advancers and 
Retreats: The Uruguay Round and Beyond,’ ch. 15, pp. 251-308 in 
Bernard Hoekman and Will Martin, eds., Developing Countries and the 
WTO: a Pro-Active Agenda, Malden, MA. USA, Blackwell. 
Finger, J. Michael and Ann Harrison. 1996. “The MFA Paradox: More Protection 
and More Trade?” ch. 4, pp. 197-259 in Anne O. Krueger (ed.) The 
  40Political Economy of American Trade Policy, Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press. 
Finger, J. Michael, Merlinda D. Ingco and Ulrich Reincke. 1996. The Uruguay 
Round: Statistics on Tariff Concessions Given and Received, Washington, 
DC, World Bank. 
Gallaway, M., B. Blonigen and J. Flynn. 1999. ‘Welfare cost of the US 
antidumping and countervailing duty law,’ Journal of International 
Economics, vol. 49, no. 2, pp.  211-44. 
G-33, African Group and ACPs. 2008. Statement of G-33, African Group, ACP and 
SVEs on Special Products and Special Safeguards Mechanism, Geneva, 
July 27 
GATT. 1994. Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, GATT, Geneva. 
GATT. 1990. The International Trade Environment, GATT—Report by the 
Director General 1989-1990, Geneva, Switzerland.  
GATT. 1958. Antidumping  and Countervailing Duties, Geneva, GATT. 
Hallaert, Jean-Jacques. 2005. Special Agricultural Safeguards: Virtual Benefits 
and Real Costs – Lessons for the Doha Round, IMF Working Paper 
WP/05/131. 
Hathaway, Dale E. 2001. A Special Agricultural Safeguard (SAS): buttressing the 
market access reforms of developing countries, Paper prepared by the 
FAO Commodities and Trade Division for the FAO Round Table on 
Selected Agricultural Trade Policy Issues, Geneva, 21 March 2001.  
Accessed September 22, 2008 at 
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/Y3733E/y3733e05.htm#fn35 
Hudec, Robert E. 1987. Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, London, 
Gower for the Trade Policy Research Center 
Hull, Cordell. 1948. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 volumes, New York: Macmillan 
International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development (ITCSD). 2008. 
‘Members Give Mixed Reactions to Lamy Compromise, Take “A Good Step 
Forward” On Services,’ BRIDGES Daily Update, 27 July 2008. 
Jales, Mario. 2005. Tariff Reduction, Special Products and Special Safeguards: An 
Analysis of the Agricultural Tariff Structures of G-33 Countries, 
International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, July 
Little, Ian M. D. 1982. Economic Development: Theory, Policy and International 
Relations, New York, Basic Books. 
Laborde, David, Will Martin and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe. 2009. 
‘Implications of the 2008 Doha Draft Agricultural and NAMA Market Access 
Modalities for Developing Countries,’ paper presented at the Eleventh 
Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis, Helsinki, 12-14 June.  
www.gtap.org. 
  41Mattoo, Aaditya and Arvind Subramanian. 2009. ‘From Doha to the Next Bretton 
Woods: A New Multilateral Trade Agenda,’ Foreign Affairs, Volume 88, 
Number 1 (January/February) pp. 15-26. 
Martin, Will and Aaditya Mattoo. 2008. The Doha Development Agenda: What is 
on the table?, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4672, July. 
Montemayor, Raul Q. 2008. ‘How Will the May 2008 “Modalities” Text Affect 
Access to the Special Safeguard Mechanism, and the Effectiveness of 
Additional Safeguard Duties?’ International Center for Trade and 
Sustainable Development Program on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable 
Development, Issue Paper No. 15, June. 
Nelson, Douglas R. 2006. ‘The Political Economy of Antidumping,’ European 
Journal of Political Economy; vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 554-590. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 1992. 
Integration of Developing Countries into the International Trading System, 
OECD, Paris. 
Porges, Amelia, Petros C. Mavroidis,  and Friedl Weiss. 1994. Analytical Index: 
Guide to GATT Law and Practice, GATT, Geneva, Switzerland, 1994  
Sampson, Gary. 1987: Safeguards, ch. 19, pp. 134-52, in J. Michael Finger and 
Andrej Olechowski (eds.), The Uruguay Round, A Handbook for the 
Multilateral Negotiations, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Stanwood, Edward. 1903. American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth 
Century, 2 vols. Garland, Boston, 1903. 
Wolfe, Robert. 2009. The special safeguard fiasco in the WTO: The perils of 
inadequate analysis and negotiation, Science Po  –  Groupe d’Economie 
Mondiale    Working Paper Febuary 10, 2009 Accessed 2 April 2009 at 
http://www.gem.sciences-
po.fr/content/publications/pdf/Wolfe_SSMFiasco10022009.pdf 
World Trade Organization. (WTO). 1995. Committee on Agriculture, Notification 
Requirements and Formats, G/AG/2 30 June 1995 
World Trade Organization (WTO). 2002. Special Agricultural Safeguard: 
Background Paper by the Secretariat, Revision G/AG/NG/S/9/Rev.1, 19 
February 2002 
World Trade Organization (WTO). 2008a. Revised Draft Modalities for 
Agriculture, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3  10 July 2008 
World Trade Organization (WTO). 2008b. Revised Draft Modalities for 
Agriculture, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 6 December 2008 
World Trade Organization (WTO). 2008b Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture 
Special Safeguard Mechanism, TN/AG/W/7, 6 December 2008 
  42  43
Valdés, Alberto and William Foster. 2005. The New SSM: A Floor Price 
Mechanism for Developing Countries, International Center for Trade and 
Sustainable Development, Geneva, July. 
Zwain, Alix Peterson. 2008. “Review of Bernard Hoekman and Marcelo Olarreaga, 
eds., Global Trade an Poor Nations: The Poverty Impact and Policy 
Implications of Liberalization, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, New Haven: Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2007)” 
Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XLVI, no. 3, pp. 728-31. September Annex 1: Details of SSG parameters and notifications of 
application of SSG measures 
The volume-triggered SSG allows WTO Members to impose an additional duty on 
over-quota imports equivalent to one-third of the over-quota tariff
58 if, in any 
given year, imports of an eligible product exceeds 125% of the average imports 
over a ‘base period’ – the most recent 3 years for which data are available.  A 
lower trigger level may be used if domestic consumption is taken into 
consideration, but in practice SSG volume trigger applications have been almost 
entirely on the basis of the 125 percent increase over base year volume.  
Canada, for example, publishes volume-trigger levels in advance, these based 
entirely on the ‘no data for domestic consumption’ version of the specifications.
59 
The price trigger allows imports to be screened shipment-by-shipment to identify 
prices below the average 1986-1988 price.  (The AoA refers to this 1986-1988 
average as the reference or trigger price.)  By the formula that defines the 
allowed additional duty, that additional duty will absorb part of the difference 
between the shipment price and the historical reference price, but never all of it.  
The additional duties cannot be applied to imports taking place within tariff 
quotas.  (Figure A1.1 illustrates how the additional duty increases as the 
shipment price falls below the trigger price.) 
Once a trigger has been tripped, the maximum duty the Member may apply on 
any import shipment has been increased by the amount of the additional duty.  
As with other GATT-sanctioned safeguard measures, any Member taking an SSG 
action must offer other Members the opportunity to consult about the conditions 
of that application, but compensation is not required and exporters have no 
recourse to retaliation. 
Administratively speaking, the volume trigger is not burdensome to operate.  To 
establish a volume trigger, the data required are the tariff item numbers and the 
volumes of imports for three previous years (the three previous years are the 
three most recent for which data are available).  So long as the member is 
satisfied with a volume trigger of 125 percent of the previous 3-year average 
(the trigger when the import consumption ratio is less than 10 percent) no data 
on domestic consumption are required.  Table A1.1 provides an example of a 
typical notification.  The duty formula is straightforward – the maximum 
additional duty is 1/3 the amount of the ordinary duty. 
Likewise, the price trigger provides minimal administrative burden.  As to data 
requirements, the trigger prices are simply 1986-88 averages of import unit 
values.  As Table A1.2 illustrates, three numbers – the unit values for each of 
three years – are all that is required.  Concerns about the invoice price on a 
                                         
58 The additional duty is 1/3 of the bound rate, not the applied rate. 
59 Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, ‘Notice of Special Agricultural Safeguard Price and Volume 
Triggers,’ at http://www.agr.gc.ca/itpd-dpci/technical/ssg_e.htm. 
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shipment being the true transactions price are the same for administering SSG 
actions as for administering ordinary customs duties.  The formula for calculating 
the additional duty that may be applied to any shipment is more complex than 
that for the volume trigger, but could be programmed by a competent technician 
in a short time.   
The major administrative constraint on applying such measures (volume or price-
based) is the requirement that the products on which measures might be applied 
had to be so marked when the post Uruguay-Round schedules of agricultural 
tariffs were submitted. 
The SSG’s price trigger system allows the importing country government to 
screen each shipment against trigger prices, but once the trigger prices are 
posted, a system such as this will be in large part self-enforced by exporters.  
Unless exporters raise their prices to the level demanded by the additional duty 
formula, that difference will be added by the importing country’s authorities – 
the buyer will pay the higher price, the choice the exporter faces is to collect the 
higher price himself or see the importing country government collect it.  
It was therefore no surprise that immediately the Uruguay Round agreements 
went into effect, several Members notified ‘up-front’ trigger prices for the tariff 
lines on which they had reserved the right to apply SSG measures.
60  The EEC 
and the US, for example, notified complete schedules of trigger prices in 1995.  
Korea notified trigger prices for 12 tariff lines in early 1995; notified the 
remainder its schedule in September 1996.  Canada posts up-front volume as 
well as price triggers, the volume triggers are recalculated each year.
61 
Notification requirements 
As to notification of SSG actions, WTO Members have agreed standardized 
formats for how they will report.
62  The document prescribes an ‘Annual 
summary of special safeguard actions taken,’ in the format of ‘Table MA.5.’  The 
following, taken from Japan’s notification of actions in 1995, illustrates format 
and content.
63
                                         
60 The AoA (Article 7) requires that any Member applying a volume triggered SSG measure must 
notify the WTO ‘as far in advance as may be practicable and any event within ten days of the 
implementation of such action.’  Canada’s (discussed elsewhere in this annex) is the only 
example of up front notification of volume triggers. 
61 The EEC notification is reported in WTO document G/AG/N/EEC/2 (8 August 1995), United 
States trigger prices in G/AG/N/USA/1 (10 February 1995); Korea in G/AG/N/KOR/2 (1 June 
1995) and G/AG/N/KOR/6 (12 September 1996).  Canada’ price and volume triggers are available 
at Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, ‘Notice of Special Agricultural Safeguard Price and Volume 
Triggers,’ at http://www.agr.gc.ca/itpd-dpci/technical/ssg_e.htm. 
62 WTO document G/AG/2 (30 June 1995) Committee on Agriculture, Notification Requirements 
and Formats. 
63 Taken from WTO document G/AG/N/JPN/7 (8 May 1996)  
MA.5  MARKET ACCESS:  JAPAN 
REPORTING PERIOD:    Fiscal year 1995 (from April 1, 1995 to March 31, 1996) 
Annual summary of special safeguard actions taken 
Tariff item 
number 
Description of  product  Whether  volume-based 
action taken during period 
Whether price-based action 
taken during period 
1108.19.099  Other starches (excluding Sago 
starches) 
None  Date of application: May 18, 
1995 
0402.10.129 Milk  powder, containing added 
sugar, of fat content by weight, not 
exceeding 1.5% 
None  Date of application: June 22, 
1995 
0404.10.149  Whey and modified whey, of fat 
content, by weight, not exceeding 
5% 







Raw silk  Period of application: from 
March 1, 1996 to March 31, 
1996 
None 
  46As this illustrates, the required information is limited to when an action was 
taken, on which tariff lines.  It does not include the volume or value of imports 
on which an additional duty was levied, nor on the magnitude of the additional 
duty levied. 
Some members provide additional information; e.g., the US and Korean reports 
provide the volume of imports on which volume-based and price-based SSG 
actions have been taken. 
US notifications indicate that all shipments are screened for the possibility of 
applying a price-based additional duty:  
United States price-based safeguards are invoked automatically on a 
shipment-by-shipment basis.  Importers who enter goods under an over-
quota tariff line are required to declare which pre-established price range 
is applicable to their product.  If there is a safeguard duty associated with 
that price range, the additional charge is assessed.
64 
US notifications on volume-based actions state the time period over which a 
volume-based additional duty is applied as well as the volumes of imports on 
which SSG action has been taken. 
Though the EEC has posted an up-front schedule of trigger prices, EEC reports 
list the products for which the special safeguard system ‘has been made 
operational’ in each marketing year; e.g., ‘In marketing year 2002/2003, the 
price-based special safeguard system has been made operational for the 
following products:’
65 
There follows in the EEC notifications a list of products, followed by the 
statement, ‘An additional import duty may be imposed if the import prices for 
above-mentioned products fall below the trigger prices, which have been notified 
to the WTO (G/AG/N/EEC/2).’
66 
It appears thus that the EEC employs a two stage monitoring process.  There are 
posted trigger prices for a spectrum of agricultural products, the system is ‘made 
operational’ each year for a specified list of these products, but the EEC does not 
specify on which, if any, of these products SSG duties have been levied.  
The EEC likewise notifies a list of products on which the volume-based special 
safeguard system has been made operational each year.  The EEC has also 
reported year-by-year that volume based safeguard action has not been invoked.  
(There is no parallel statement for price-based action.) 
                                         
64 G/AG/N/USA/61 (17 December 2007) p. 1. 
65 G/AG/N/EEC/54 (14 February 2008) p. 1. 
66 G/AG/N/EEC/54 (14 February 2008) p. 1. 
  47Application of SSG measures 
Notifications of measures are summarized in Table A1.3. These numbers came 
from a review of national notifications available on the WTO documents website.  
In this review I found that a number of WTO Members who have reserved in 
their schedules the right to apply SSG measures have notified year-by-year that 
they have taken no SSG actions.
67  Other countries have taken limited actions.  
Norway is an example.  A search of WTO documents identified nine SSG 
notifications from Norway  The first seven are MA.5 notifications of no SSG 
actions in 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001. 
The eighth is a MA.3 notification of a Volume-based action on one product, 
(flakes and granules of potatoes; tariff item number: 1105.20)  The ninth 
notification, submitted 15 September 2008, reports no SSG actions in 2002, 2005 
and 2007.  It also reports that for flakes and granules of potatoes ‘Action 
commenced 5 April 2006 and ceased on 31 December 2006.’
68 
Among developed Members, the United States, Japan, and the EC appear to be 
the main users of SSG system.
69  The Rep. of Korea and Chinese Taipei have 
applied a number of measures while other developing Members have been 
occasional appliers.  The numbers of tariff lines for which major users have 
reported SSG application are listed in Tables A1.4 through A1.10.  Because the 
SSG system functions as a minimum price system, the impact of the SSG system 
should not be judged by the number of products on which duties were levied. 
The typical pattern of usage is that measures remain if force on products for 
several years.  For example, in 1999, Costa Rica imposed price-based measures 
on 4 tariff items.  Three of those were subject to measures through 2003; Costa 
Rica has imposed no other SSG measures.  Other examples: 
  the EC volume-based special safeguard has been operational for the same list 
of fruits and vegetables since the SSG mechanism was created, the price-
based special safeguard year-by-year for poultry meat and sugar.   
  of the 17 products on which Chinese Taipei has applied measures, on only 
one have measures not been in place in consecutive years; on 6, measures 
have been in place each year, 2002-2007. 
                                         
67 The Members whose notifications I have reviewed are the following.  The year or crop year in 
parenthesis is the most recent year for which a notification is available on the WTO documents 
database as of 09 January 2009. Australia (2006); Botswana (2007/2008); Canada (2007); 
Colombia (2004); Ecuador (2005); El Salvador (2002/2003); Iceland (2002/2003); Indonesia 
(2000); Israel (2004); Malaysia (2007); Mexico (2005); Namibia (no notifications ); New Zealand 
(2007); South Africa (2006); Swaziland (no notifications ); Thailand (2006); Venezuela (1998) 
68 G/AG/N/NOR/48 (17 September 2008) p. 2 
69 Hallaert (2005), tabulated all notified actions through 2000, notes also that transition 
economies, particularly Poland were also significant users.  The transition economies who were 
significant users have since become Member States in the EC. 
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Some details of product coverage: 
EEC price-based:  The price-based list includes sugar and molasses plus poultry 
meat and poultry meat products.  Sugar and molasses appear on the ‘made 
operational’ list each year.  Chicken meat has been on the list every year, turkey 
carcasses and pieces were added in 2001/2002. (Year by year coverages are 
compared in Table A1.11.)  
EEC volume-based: Vegetables and fruits make up the list for which the EEC 
volume-based SSG system has been operational.  The same products; e.g., 
tomatoes, cucumbers, apples, lemons, oranges; are on the list each year.  Each 
product is on the ‘made operational list for the same period each year; e.g., 
oranges, 1 December 2002 to 31 May 2003 for the 2002/2003 marketing year; a 
parallel period, 1 December to the next 31 May for other marketing years. Many 
products are on the ‘made operational’ list for the entire year, e.g., tomatoes and 
cucumbers. (Year by year coverages are compared in Table A1.12.) 
United States: The list of products on which the United States reports  price-
based actions is likewise much the same from one year to the next.  The list 
includes sugar and products containing sugar, milk and milk products such as 
cheeses and yogurt.  Some years peanuts and cotton are on the list, others not.  
The United States has reported volume-based actions in only two years; 1998: 
on sheep meat, 6 tariff lines, on 3,709 tones; 2002: on Cheese and curd, 2 tariff 
lines, 2,071 kg. 
Japan: Japan’s reporter actions have been more volume-based than price-based.  
Again the list of products varies little from year to year; products on the list 
include swine and swine meat, milk and milk products, beans of various types, 
rice and wheat and flours and starches of wheat and rice. 
Korea: The list includes groundnuts; wheat, buckwheat along with their starches 
and other vegetable starches and meals; peas and beans; ginseng and products.  
As with other countries, the list changes little from year to year.   
Chinese Taipei has continuously (2002-2007) applied SSG measures on chicken 
parts, liquid milk, peanuts, oriental pears and red beans.  Measures were applied 
on sugar 2002-2005, but there are no more recent notifications of SSG measures 
on sugar.  (As of 09 January 2009).  
Tables at the end of this annex list the year-to-year product coverage of SSG 
measures by major users. Figure A1-1: Illustration of the magnitude of the additional duty allowed by the SSG price-
based formula
(as the shipment price falls, the duty-inclusive price declines to about  65 percent of the 









Trigger price = 100
Shipment price
Shipment price + addl. duty
  50Table A1.1: Example of SSG Volume-Based Measure Notification 
 
Volume-based Measure  
The following notification concerning the volume-based special safeguard (Table 
MA:3) was received from the delegation of the United States on 28 August 
1998. 
MARKET ACCESS:  United States 
Notification under Article 5 of the Agreement:  special safeguard:  volume-based 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––- 
1.  Description of product:    Sheep meat 
2. Tariff  item  numbers:  0204.21.00, 
0204.22.40, 0204.23.40, 0204.41.00, 
0204.42.40, 0204.43.40 
3.  Trigger level: 9,335 MT 
4.  Volume of imports entering  
  territory in current period: 1 January 1998 
through 2 August 1998  
   10,865.569  MT 
5.  Period of application:  From 10 August 
1998 to 31 December 1998 
Information required for the calculation of the Trigger Level: 
  Imports in the preceding years: 
 1995:  2,826  MT 
 1996:  9,787  MT 
 1997:  9,792  MT 
 Average:  7,468  MT 
Note:  In accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 5 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, the base trigger level was calculated as 125% of the 3-year average 
imports. 
Source: WTO Document (G/AG/N/USA/18)
  51Table A1.2: Example of SSG Price-Based Measure Notification 
 
Price-based Measure  
The following notification concerning the price-based special safeguard (Table 
MA.4) was received from the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica on 7 October 
2002. 
MARKET ACCESS:  Costa Rica 
Notification under Article 5 of the Agreement: 
Special Safeguard:  Price-Based 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––- 
 (1)  Description of product:     Rice  in  the  husk 
(2)  Tariff  item  number:     1006.10.90 
(3)  Trigger  price:      US$223.78/tonne 
  (as calculated in Annex 1) 
(4)  Date of application:     27  September  2002   
_______________ 
SPECIAL SAFEGUARD:  PRICE-BASED:  Annex 1 to Table MA.4 
Information required for the calculation of the Trigger Price 
  Prices in the reference period:1986 
 US$201.60/tonne 
   1987 
 US$213.35/tonne 
   1988 
 US$256.07/tonne 
   Average
 US$223.78/tonne 
Source of price information:  IICA - CIAPA. 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Source: WTO document (G/AG/N/CRI/14)
  52Table A1.3: Notifications of SSG Measures by major users 
 
Member 
Maximum number in any one 
year, 1995 through year 























e  n.a. 15 54  2007 
Costa  Rica  87 4 0  2007 
European Communities  539  17  27
f 2006/2007 
Hungary
a  117 7 0  2004 
Japan 121  16  61
c 2007 
Korea 111  8  13  2004 
Norway  49 0 1  2006 
Poland
a 144  106
d 0  2004 
Slovakia
a  114 0 4  2004 
Switzerland-Liechtenstein 961 7 0  2006 
United States  189  83  6  2006 
Source: WTO 2002 (covers 1995-2001) and country annual notifications available 
on the WTO Documents online website. 
Notes: 
n.a. = not available 
a  Acceded to the EU in May 2004. 
b  as of 09 January 2009. 
c  Second-largest number is 10. 
d  Second-largest number is 7. 
e  Acceded to the WTO 1 April 2002; first annual notification is for 2002. 
f  The number of tariff lines for which EC notifications indicate that the volume-
based system was ‘made operational.’  EC notifications also state each year that 
no volume-based measure was ‘applied.’  There is no parallel notification for the 
EC price-based system. 
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8-digit lines) (8-digit lines) 
1995   5  3 
1996   71  0 
1997   5  0 
1998   3  2 
1999 1  2  8 
2000 1  6  4 
2001   10  0 
2002   0  8 
2003 6  1  13 
2004   0  9 
2005   4  6 
2006   2  16 
2007   5  10 
Source: Tabulated from national notifications of SSG actions, available on the 
WTO documents website.  
Notes 
a  The fiscal year runs from 1 April of the year indicated until 31 March of the 
following calendar year; e.g. FY 1995 covers 1 April 1995 – 31 March 1996.   
b  In 1996, the large number of tariff lines were for live swine and swine meat. 
1999 and 2000: the 5-digit heading was Inulin.  2003: the 5-digit headings were 
for butter and other dairy fats and for Maize (corn) starch and other vegetable 
starches and products. 
The principal products covered were Milk and products, rice, beans, wheat and 
rice flours and starches, swine and swine meat, raw silk. 
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Table A1.5: United States; Numbers of tariff headings subject to SSG Actions, 
1995-2006 
  Tariff Lines subject to actions 
Year Volume-based
a Price-based 
1995 0  24 
1996 0  49 
1997 0  74 
1998 6  74 
1999 0  35 
2000 0  37 
2001 0  44 
2002 2  51 
2003 0  65 
2004 0  83 
2005 0  65 
2006 0  72 
Memo item: Number of tariff 
lines for which trigger prices 
were notified ‘up-front’  181 
Source: Tabulated from national notifications of SSG actions, available on the 
WTO documents website.  
Notes: 
a  Volume-based measures 1998 on sheep meat, 6 tariff lines, on 3,709 tonnes; 
2002 on Cheese and curd, 2 tariff lines, 2,071 kg. 
Price-based measures covered principally Cheeses and products, Milk and other 
dairy products, Sugar and products containing sugar, Beef, Peanuts and 
products, Short and long staple cotton. 
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Table A1.6: Republic of Korea; Numbers of tariff headings subject to SSG 
Actions, 1995-2004 
  Tariff Lines subject to actions 
Year Volume-based Price-based 
1995 0  3 
1996 0  5 
1997 2  7 
1998 2  7 
1999 2  6 
2000 13  8 
2001 8  8 
2002 3  7 
2003 10  8 
2004 4  8 
Sums 44  67 
Memo item: Number of 
tariff lines for which 
trigger prices were 
notified ‘up-front’  99
Source: Tabulated from national notifications of SSG actions, available on the 
WTO documents website.  
Note: 
Product coverage; principally Groundnuts; Wheat, buckwheat along with their 
starches, Other vegetable starches and meals; Peas and beans; Ginseng and 
products. 
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Table A1.7: European Economic Communities, Numbers of tariff lines for which 
the special safeguard system was operational (EC schedule lines, 8-digit) 




1995/1996 not  invoked  12 
1996/1997 26  14 
1997/1998 26  13 
1998/1999 27  12 
1999/2000 26  13 
2000/2001 27  13 
2001/2002 27  17 
2002/2003 27  16 
2003/2004 27  17 
2004/2005 27  17 
2005/2006 27  15 
Memo item: Number of tariff 
lines for which trigger prices 




Source: Tabulated from national notifications of SSG actions, available on the 
WTO documents website.  
Note:  
a  The EEC has notified annually, 1995/96 through 2005/2006, that volume-based action 
has not been invoked.’  There is no parallel notification for price-based measures. 







2002 11  13 
2003 54  5 
2004 34  2 
2005 42  6 
2006 31  5 
2007 21  15 
Source: Tabulated from Chinese Taipei notifications, WTO documents 
G/AG/N/TPKM/8, 20, 27, 36, 46, and 58. 
 







1995 0  0 
1996 0  0 
1997 0  0 
1998 0  0 
1999 0  0 
2000 0  0 
2001 0  0 
2002 1  6 
2003 0  0 
2004 0  2 
Source: Tabulated from Philippines notification, WTO documents 
G/AG/N/PHL/33. (Philippines notifications are not available for later years.) 
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Table A1.10: Poland: Numbers of tariff headings subject to SSG Actions, 1995-
2004 
  Tariff Lines subject to actions 
Year Volume-based
a Price-based 
1995 0  0 
1996 0  2 
1997 1  3 
1998 1  5 
1999 1  113 
2000 2  9 
2001 1  8 
2002 0  138 
2003 0  14 
2004
a 0  100 
Memo item: Number of tariff 
lines for which trigger prices 
were notified ‘up-front’  140 
Source: Tabulated from national notifications of SSG actions, available on the 
WTO documents website.  
Note: a  01 January – 30 April.  Poland acceded to the EC on 01 May 2004 
 Table A1.11: Products for which the EEC Price-based SSG system was operational, by marketing year 



























































































































0207 12 10  Chicken carcasses, 70%, frozen               X  
0207 12 90  Chicken carcasses, 65%, frozen        X X X X  X X  X X 
0207 14 10  Boneless cuts of fowls of the species gallus 
domesticus,
a frozen  X X  X X X X X  X X  X X 
0207 14 50  Chicken breasts, frozen           X  X  X  X 
0207 14 60  Chicken legs, frozen        X  X  X  X  X   
0207 14 70  Other chicken cuts, frozen        X X X          
0207 25 10  Turkey carcasses, 80%, frozen        X  X  X  X  X   
0207 27 10  Boneless cuts of turkey  X  X           X 
0207 27 10  Boneless cuts of turkey        X  X  X  X  X   
0207 36 15  Boneless cuts of ducks and guinea fowls, frozen        X  X  X  X  X   
1602 32 11  Preparations of uncooked fowl of the species gallus 
domesticus
a  X X  X X X X X  X X  X X 
1701 11 10  Cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose, in 
solid form  X X  X X X X X  X X  X X 
1701 11 90  “  X X  X X X X X  X X  X X 
1701 12 10  “  X X  X X X X X  X X  X X 
1701 12 90  “  X X  X X X X X  X X  X X 
1701 91 00  “  X X  X X X X X  X X  X X 
1701 99 10  “  X X  X X X X X  X X  X X 
1701 99 90  “  X X  X X X X X  X X  X X 
1702 90 99  Other sugar  X X  X X X X X  X X  X X 
1703 10 00  Cane molasses  X X  X X X X X  X X  X X 
1703 90 00  Other molasses  X X  X X X X X  X X  X X 
Source: Tabulated from national notifications of SSG actions, available on the WTO documents website  
Footnote;  
a gallus domesticus  is chicken. 
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Table A1.12: European Economic Communities;  Products for which the volume-based special safeguard was operational 
Marketing Year 
1995/1996 96/97  1997/1998  1998/1999 through 2005/2006 
     
Not invoked  Tomatoes   Tomatoes   Tomatoes  
 Cucumbers    Cucumbers   Cucumbers  
    Artichokes   
    Courgettes   
  Oranges Oranges Oranges 
  Clementines     Clementines  
 
Mandarines, including tangerines, 
satsumas, wilkings and similar 
citrus hybrids 
Mandarines, including tangerines, 
satsumas, wilkings and similar 
citrus hybrids 
Mandarins, including tangerines, 
satsumas, wilkings and similar 
citrus hybrids 
  Lemons   Lemons   Lemons  
    Table grapes   Table grapes  
  Apples     Apples  
   Cherries  Cherries 
  Pears     Pears  
    A p r i c o t s    
      Peaches, including nectarines  
    Plums 
     
Source: Tabulated from national notifications of SSG actions, available on the WTO documents website  
  61Table A1.13: Chinese Taipei; products on which SSG measures were applied, 
2002-2007 
Number of tariff lines on which volume-based or price-based SSG 
measures were applied  Product  
Year   2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Betel  Nuts  1 1 0 0 0 0 
Chicken  Legs  and  Wings  3 1 1 1 1 1 
Dried  Day  Lilies  1 0 0 0 0 0 
Dried  Shiitake  1 2 1 1 1 0 
Fresh  Milk  0 2 2 0 0 0 
Garlic  Bulb  2 2 2 0 2 2 
Liquid  Milk  3 8 8 8 8 8 
Oriental  Pears  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Other  Chicken  Cuts  2 1 1 1 1 1 
Peanuts  3 6 7 7 7 7 
Persimmon  1 1 0 1 0 0 
Pork  Belly  0 0 0 4 4 4 
Poultry  offal  0 0 0  13 0 0 
Red  Bean  4 1 1  11 1 1 
Rice  0 10 10  0 10 10 
Shaddock  1 1 0 0 0 1 
Sugar  1  22 2 0 0 0 
Total  24 59 36 48 36 36 
Source: Tabulated from Chinese Taipei notifications, WTO documents 
G/AGRICULTURE/N/TPKM/8, 20, 27, 36, 46, and 58. 
 
  62Annex 2: Share of United States SSG-eligible Imports on 
which SSG measures were imposed, 2006 
by J. Michael Finger and Francis Ng 
The tabulation of applications of SSG measures (Table A1.3, above) indicates 
that Members have applied relatively few measures.  Of the 39 members who 
reserved tariff lines for possible SSG measures, only 10 have notified SSG 
measures, and applications have covered only a fraction of the tariff lines which 
Members reserved for possible SSG application. 
This annex provides an attempt to examine further the scope of SSG application 
and to undertake a preliminary look at one possible explanation for the observed 
limited application: that agricultural prices have been above the trigger prices.  
As Member are not required to notify the volume of imports on which SSG 
measures are applied – only to list the tariff items – information for further 
analysis is limited.  The United States does however report the volume on which 
measures are applied, these data allow then a calculation of the fraction of 
imports subject to SSG application.  
We find in this analysis that the United States has applied SSG measures on less 
than 1 percent of the imports of products on which SSG application has been 
notified.  A possible behavioral explanation for this finding is that exporters might 
price to the trigger prices so as to avoid paying the SSG additional duties.  An 
alternative explanation that we also explore in the annex is that agricultural 
prices were generally above the trigger prices. 
US imports on which SSG measures were applied  
The United States in 1995, notified trigger prices for 180 8-digit tariff lines, Table 
A1.5, above, reports the numbers of tariff lines on which the United States has 
notified actions. 
Volume-based measures were imposed only in 1998 and in 2002; in 1998 on 
sheep meat (6 tariff lines, on 3,709 tonnes of imports); in 2002 on cheese and 
curd (2 tariff lines, 2,071 kg. 
In this annex we examine only the price-based actions for 2006.  The following 
table summarizes our comparison of the volumes subject to such action with the 
total volume of over-quota imports.  (SSG measures may not be applied to 
imports inside of the tariff rate quota, TRQ, on a product.)  
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action taken / 
o-q total 
imports 
Meat 2,693,980 72,377,576  3.72 
Milk and dairy products   602,386 108,214,484  0.56 
Peanuts and preparations of peanuts  114,945 6,176,855  1.86 
Sugar 65,952 495,692,003  0.01 
Cocoa powder, chocolate  products 
containing sugar and milk  153,614 14,059,022  1.09 
Coffee products  31 2,002,814  0.00 
Short-staple cotton  54 7,504  0.72 
All products  3,630,962 698,530,258  0.52 
 
Remembering that imports are screened shipment-by-shipment against trigger 
prices, the basic point the table makes is that only a few shipments have been 
subject to SSG measures.  The ‘bottom line’ in Table A2.1 is ‘0.5 percent,’ and 
the base for this figure is the total over the 72 tariff lines over which SSG 
measures were applied.  It does not take into account the other 108 tariff lines 
that were screened against trigger prices but on which no SSG actions were 
taken.  Even among the products on which some shipments were subject to SSG 
duties, SSG measures have been applied to a small share of imports.  Of on 
which the United States reported SSG price-based action, the actions were 
applied to less than 1 percent of imports. 
The obvious conclusion is that SSG price-based measures have been applied to a 
small fraction of imports that are screened for such application.   
Trigger prices compared with import unit values  
There are several possible explanations for this low figure: 
  The minimum price system works – exporters do raise their prices to avoid 
paying SSG duties. 
  There is sufficient space between US bound and applied tariff rates so that 
minimum prices (prices at the level of the trigger prices) can be enforced 
without recourse to the additional duties the SSG allows. 
  Import unit values in 2006 were generally above the trigger prices, i.e., 
above 1986-88 prices. 
Of the three explanations, we have looked into only the third.  To do so we 
calculated unit values for each of the tariff lines for which the US had posted up-
front trigger prices – and for which we were found import quantity data so that 
unit values could be calculated.  (The reader should not that these unit values 
are calculated from imports from all sources.)  Table A2.2 summarizes our 
findings.  
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Table A2.2:  Summary of Comparison of United States SSG Trigger Prices and 
2006 Unit Values of Imports from all sources
a 
  Number of tariff lines 
With Posted Trigger Prices
b and Quantity data to 
allow calculation of Unit Values  
 
120 
All source unit value above trigger price   104 
All source unit value below trigger price   16 
SSG measures were applied to at least one shipment   
57 
of these, the Unit Value for all import 




a.  These unit values were calculated for imports from all sources.  SSG 
measures are applied by screening each shipment against trigger prices. 
b.  The United States posted ‘upfront’ trigger prices for 180 tariff items – as 
reported in WTO document G/AG/N/USA/1/Add.1, 02 November 1995.  For 60 of 
these we were not able to obtain import quantity data. 
One more matter we examine here is how agricultural prices in 2006 – the only 
year for which we have compared them with trigger prices – compare with other 
years when Members might have applied SSG measures.  Figure A2.1 indicates 
that generally speaking, agricultural prices have been higher than their level in 
the SSG base period (1986-88) but in the four years 1999-2002 were notably 
below that level.  Even so, as Table A1.5 documents, that period was not marked 


















  66Source: World Bank's Development Prospects Group web data. 
Conclusions from this annex 
1.  The United States, like other Members, has applied SSG measures to only a 
few of the tariff lines on which they – legally speaking – might have applied 
them. 
2.  Even on these tariff lines they have applied SSG measures to only a small 
percentage of shipment. 
3.  In 2006, the only year for which we have compared trigger prices with import 
unit values, trigger prices were in large part irrelevant – unit values were 
substantially above them. 
4.  In years in which agricultural prices were below their 1986-88 level (the base 
for the trigger prices) members applied hardly more SSG measures than 
when they were below that level. 
5.  The SSG formula provide Members with legal discretion to apply additional 
import restrictions, Members have not used them as guidelines as to when it 
makes sense to apply import restrictions.  
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developing country imports  
Table A3.1: Unit Value Simulation: Percentages of agricultural imports from individual countries 
with unit values at least 15 percent less than the unit value of imports from all sources – by 
importing country 
Importer 





from DCs  
 % of Imports with unit 
value 15 percent or 
more below unit value of 
imports from all sources 







Brazil 1,504,351 99 47.8 4.4 
China 9,608,243 59 0.2 2.4 
India 1,309,936 56 0.1 0.3 
Indonesia 2,275,094 26 2.5 24.0 
Malaysia 2,489,827 66 1.2 14.0 
Mexico 4,589,471 5 3.2 7.8 
All above countries  21,776,922 48 1.8 5.7 
* Imports of the countries in the sample: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Mexico 
For the six developing countries whose import data were examined, the 
unintended consequence this exercise has brought forward would be 
authorization for restrictions on almost 6 percent of agricultural imports from 
developing countries, on about 2 percent of agricultural imports from developed 
countries – at least one restriction on more than half of the tariff lines.   
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Table A3.2: Unit Value Simulation: Numbers of actions triggered, by importing country and 
Numbers of tariff lines on which the hypothetical trigger would impose an import restriction on 
imports from at least one country 
 
Total # of 
restrictions 
against ICs  
Total # of 
restrictions 
against DCs  
Total # of 
restrictions 
against DCs + 
ICs  
Number of HS 





China 15 24 39  15
India 10 18 28  13
Indonesia 30 49 79  17
Malaysia 12 34 46  20
Brazil 5 9 14  9
Mexico 11 9 20  13
Of these:   
    Asian countries  67 125 192  65
    Latin American countries  16 18 34  22
    All six countries  83 143 226  87
  69Annex 4: Levels of Bounds and Applied Tariff Rates, Spreads 
between Bound and Applied Rates 
Table A4.1 documents differences across Member groups, Tables A4.2 and A4.3 
document differences within groups.   
Levels of rates 
Tariff rates vary considerably among Members, differences within income groups 
being as large as those between these groups.  Among middle income members, 
averages of applied rates range 6 percent for Chile and Russia to over 60 percent 
for Tunisia and Egypt.  But even among high income members the range is 
large.  The category in the last line of Table A4.1, High Income OECD Members, 
includes Australia and New Zealand, whose applied rates average below 2 
percent.  It also includes Norway, the Rep. of Korea and Switzerland, whose 
applied rates average more than 40 percent.  Even among G-33 countries the 
differences are large.  Eight G-33 countries have no agricultural tariff lines bound 
above 60 percent; for 9 countries all of their agricultural tariff lines carry bound 
rates above 60 percent.  (Table A4.3) 
Spreads of rates 
From group to group, spreads between bound and applied rates range from 
almost 60 percentage points for Low Income Members to about 17 percentage 
points for High Income OECD Members.  (right-hand column of Table A4.1)  
There are however pronounced variations within income groups.  Within the 10 
Members categorized in Tables A4.1 and A4.2 as High Income OECD Members 
(the EC-27 is treated as one WTO Member) the spread between bound and 
applied rates is near zero for several Members, above 60 percentage points for 
others.  Among developing Members, the spread is near zero, for example, for 
China and the three Chinese customs territories treated as separate WTO 
Members (Hong Kong, China; Macau, China and Chinese Taipei); over 100 
percentage points for a number of others. (Table A4.2)   
  70Table A4.1: Average
a applied and bound tariff rates
b on agricultural products, by 











d 61.1  16.8  45.0 
Low Income (52)  74.2  16.2  58.3 
Middle Income (77)  53.2  17.2  36.8 
High Income Non-OECDs (14)  39.5  9.2  32.0 
High Income OECDs (10)  42.5  25.4  17.1 
Source: Tabulated from WTO, World Tariff Profiles 2008; WTO website 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_profiles08_e.pdf (16 January 
2009) 
Notes: 
a  These averages are simple averages across countries of simple averages of 
rates by tariff line for each country.  The number of WTO members covered by 
the averages are: 46 Low Income, 79 Middle Income, 14 High Income non-
OECD, and 10 High Income OECD.  The EC-27 is treated as one Member.  
b  Ad valorem equivalents. 
c  Averages of country differences rather than differences of the averages in the 
previous columns. 
d  Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of WTO Members in each group 
covered by the data base.
  71Table A4.2:  Examples of high and low tariff rates on agricultural products within groups (simple averages across WTO 
Members of simple averages across tariff lines for each Member) 2008 
LOW INCOME  MIDDLE INCOME 
Lowest applied  Highest applied  Lowest applied  Highest applied 
Palau  2.7 Sudan  30.6 Russian Fed.  5.3  Turkey  46.7 
Mongolia  5.1 India  34.4 Chile  6.0  Tunisia  65.1 
Haiti  5.7 Bhutan  41.4 Armenia  6.9  Egypt  66.4 
                 
Lowest bound  Highest bound  Lowest bound  Highest bound 
Kyrgyz Republic  13.1  Zimbabwe  140.1  Albania  9.4  Tunisia  116.3 
Cote d'Ivoire  14.9  Nigeria  150.0  Ukraine  10.9  Mauritius  119.6 
Viet Nam  18.5  Bangladesh  192.0  Montenegro  11.3  Lesotho  200.0 
                  
Smallest Spread;   Largest Spread;   Smallest Spread;  Largest Spread;  
Bound - Applied  Bound - Applied  Bound - Applied  Bound - Applied 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.4  Zimbabwe  114.7  China  0.0  Saint Lucia  99.8 
Kyrgyz Republic  5.1  Nigeria  134.4  Croatia  0.6  Mauritius  112.2 
Central African Rep.  8.1  Bangladesh  175.1  Albania  1.6  Lesotho  190.4 
                       
HIGH INCOME NON-OECD   HIGH INCOME OECD 
Lowest applied  Highest applied  Lowest applied  Highest applied 
Hong Kong, China  0.0  Israel  17.1 Australia  1.3 Switzerland  43.5 
Macau, China  0.0  Taipei, Chinese  17.5 New  Zealand  1.7 Korea,  Rep.  49.0 
Singapore 0.1  Bahamas  23.6 United  States  5.5 Norway  57.8 
                
Lowest bound  Highest bound  Lowest bound  Highest bound 
Hong Kong, China  0.0  Israel  73.3 Australia 3.3 Korea,  Rep.  59.3 
Macau, China  0.0  Kuwait  100.0 United States  5.0 Iceland  109.3 
Taipei, Chinese  18.4  Antigua & Barbuda  105.0 New Zealand  5.7 Norway  135.8 
               
Smallest Spread;   Largest Spread;   Smallest Spread;   Largest Spread;  
Bound - Applied  Bound - Applied  Bound - Applied  Bound - Applied 
Hong Kong, China  0.0  Israel  56.2 Canada  0.0 Switzerland  10.8 
Macau, China  0.0  Antigua & Barbuda  90.0 United  States  0.0 Iceland  68.5 
Taipei,  Chinese  0.9  Kuwait  96.0 European  Communities  0.0 Norway  78.0 
Source:  Same as Table A4.1 
  72Table A4.3:  Bound tariff rates (ad valorem equivalents) on agricultural products; Examples of differences among G-33 
countries 
Dimension Low
a Middle  High 
Median rate  China, 13% 
Cote d’Ivoire, 15% 
Turkey, 58%  Zimbabwe, 150% 
Nigeria, 150% 
Maximum rate  Suriname, 20% 
Mongolia, 40% 
Venezuela, 135%  Korea Rep, 887% 
Botswana, 597% 
Percentage of tariff 
lines with rate above 
60 percent  
8 countries, 0%  Botswana, 16%  9 countries, 100% 
Source: Tabulated from Jales 2005, Table 1, p. 8. 
Note: a  The figures following the commas are ad valorem equivalent rates. 
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